LIFE AND DEATH OF THE BUDDHA
=============================
Siddhatha Gotama's birth in the Fifth Century BCE was an extraordinary time in human history. Confucious, Lao Tzu of Taoism, Mahavira of Jainism were the Buddha's contemporaries, not to mention several of the most well known materialists in Indian history---Puruna Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, Ajita Kesakambali and Pakudha Kaccayana. The Buddha's birthplace was at Kapilavastu, in present day Nepal; his parents were King Suddhodana and Queen Maya, rulers of the Sakya kingdom. Unfortunately, Maya died shortly after Siddhatha's birth. Pajapati Gotami, a.k.a., Mahayapati, Maya's sister and Suddhodana's eventual second wife, cared for and raised Siddhatha.
Siddhatha was trained and educated a prince of the kingdom and in young manhood married his cousin Yasodhara who bore him a son named Rahula. Although living a comfortable existence, he was continually reminded of the suffering he witnessed around him. Dissatisfied that he did not find the answers to his many questions on human suffering, in his 29th year, he decided to leave the household life and entered into homelessness in search of answers, a practice common among seekers of his time. He spent the ensuing six years an ascetic, mastering the knowledge available to him. In his 35th year he attained enlightenment and for the remaining 45 years of his life spread the dhamma to any who would listen. At the age of 80 the Buddha passed away in Kusinara, present day India. His last words were:
"Now, monks, I declare to you: all conditioned things are of a nature to decay---strive on untiringly" (Mahaparinibbana DN ii. 156).
The bookends of the Buddha's teaching began with "All this is suffering" and ended with his resounding last words, "All this is impermanent---strive on untiringly". Much is made of the compassion of the Buddha; well, here is a great example of his compassion in the summation of his life. The Buddha's confidence in people did not allow him to give up on anyone, not for any reason. His confidence was based on his unfailing belief in human effort, the ability of people to "strive on untiringly", strive on to remove the craving and attachment we have for an impermanent world which are the very causes of human suffering.
The Buddha called this striving the "noble search" as opposed to the sorrow filled "ignoble search (Ariyapariyesana MN I. 162)", i.e., the pursuit for what is subject to birth, old age, sickness, injury, death and suffering. The objective of the noble search is finally the search for Nibbana, the search for the good and peaceful, "...the undefiled supreme security from bondage...(Ariyapariyesana MN I. 163)". The Buddha's noble search and its results are documented in the Sutta Pitaka.
THE SUTTA PITAKA
=================
The Sutta Pitaka, the discourses of the Buddha, was orally transmitted from monk to monk in the nearly 500 years following the Buddha's death. It was eventually recorded in the Pali language in Sri Lanka in the First Century BCE. The Sutta Pitaka is one of three divisions of the Tipitaka [The Three Baskets] of the Pali Canon. The others are the 1) Vinaya Pitaka- Basket of the Rules of the Sangha [community of monks] and the 2) Abhidhamma Pitaka -Basket of the philosophical treatment of the dhamma. Of the Three Baskets, the Sutta Pitaka is of the greatest interest, holding as it does the original discourses of the Buddha. The Sutta Pitaka is told in the discursive style; it was the custom of the Buddha to implement his teachings with the use of metaphor, simile, analogy, story telling and in general drawing on experiences and examples from everyday life.
At first encounter, anyone accustomed to the portability of the Hindu Baghavad Gita, Christian Bible or Muslim Koran will be astonished by the length of the Sutta Pitaka. The faithfulness of the monks in recording the transmitted words of the Buddha and human memory being what it is, dependent on endless repetitions and duplications, would explain much of the length of the Sutta Pitaka. Interestingly, according to a scholar of Pali, the language of the Sutta Pitaka, Pali, is "Unlike English or even Sanskrit. Pali is a highly specialized language with only one major sphere of application---the Buddha's teachings (SN1 Preface p. 12)". The Sutta Pitaka consists of five Nikayas, Collections of Discourses, which are listed below:
Digha Nikaya - Long Discourses of the Buddha
Majjhima Nikaya - Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha
Samyutta Nikaya - Connected Discourses of the Buddha
Anguttara Nikaya - Book of the Elevens
Khuddaka Nikaya - Collection of Small Books
The Nikayas are gathered according to the length of their suttas, going from the longest to the shortest. The Digha Nikaya, the first of the Nikayas, is appropriately called the Long Discourses of the Buddha. Although the titles of the parts, divisions and suttas of the Nikayas will give the reader some indication of the topics under discussion, the Nikayas themselves are a mishmash of discourses with "no unfolding development of thought" (MN Intro p. 19). The current Nikaya translations are intended for "the nonspecialists with a personal rather than a professional interest in Buddhism" (SN1 Preface p. 12). Nevertheless, the arrangements of the Nikayas are not helpful to either the nonspecialists or professionals.
Even further complicating the Nikaya picture is that the Buddha met with people from all walks of life---young and old, rich and poor, educated and uneducated---and spoke to them according to their level of understanding and in a manner familiar to them. Consequently, the Buddha's descriptions and responses to his listeners may at first appear bewildering to the reader. For example, in the Acchariya-abbuta Sutta (MN iii.119) is told the story of Siddhatha's wonderful and marvelous journey from his previous life, as a person named Vessantara, to his stay in Tusita heaven prior to descending into his mother's womb and finally on to his rebirth.
His rebirth was greeted by gods, human beings and "two jets of water (which) appeared to pour from the sky, one cool one warm, for bathing the Bodhisatta (Siddhatha prior to attaining Buddhahood) and his mother". As soon as Siddhatha was born, he said he could walk and speak, announcing "I am the highest in the world; I am the best in the world; I am foremost in the world. This is my last birth; now there is no renewal of being for me". Ananda, the Buddha's cousin, recalled there followed "a great immeasurable light surpassing the splendour of the gods appeared" and remembered it "as a wonderful and marvelous quality to the Blessed One".
What to make of this fantastic account of the Buddha's final rebirth? The fantasy of the sutta suggests there is a lot of fiction going on here. This raises the question, is the sutta closer to Buddhist fiction or to Buddhist fact? The answer depends on the reader having knowledge of the core teachings of the Buddha, the Four Noble Truths, which would allow the reader to distinguish Buddhist fiction from fact. In the Acchariya-abbuta Sutta, the parts of the story relating to the Buddha's previous life, his descent into his mother's womb, his rebirth and jubilation upon realizing this is his last rebirth accords with an empirical description of the Buddha's rebirth.
If one decides the teachings are fundamentally empirical, the other descriptions can be isolated as fictional embellishments to the story. Why did the Buddha create such fantastic descriptions, not only in this sutta, but, in many other suttas? A likely reason is that fantasy was a way for the Buddha to teach the dhamma to the many raised on the metaphysical. By packaging his teachings in the fantastic his teachings became much more familiar to his listeners. The Buddha was a showman in this way, but, make no mistake about it, what really counted to him is the dhamma and its empirical core. The Buddha makes this clear when he concludes the Acchariya-abbhuta Sutta not with the fantastic, but, the marvelous and wonderful empirical: "feelings, perceptions, thoughts arises, become present and ceases". It is the empirical that is marvelous and wonderful, the fantastic mere embellishments, is the conclusion of the Acchariya-abbhuta Sutta.
Clearly, navigating the Nikayas is not an easy task to begin with and is almost impossible to grasp without some guidance on the Buddha's worldview. A non-professional would do well to rely on a commentator he/she feels in tune with. The Buddha's many different views are scattered throughout the Sutta Pitaka and a skillful commentator not only will be able to organize that information, but, also organize the material in the Abhidhamma Pitaka and Vinaya Pitaka as well. Additionally, a good portion of the discourses are also related to the Buddha's discussions with his many competitors---Hindus, Jains, materialists, skeptics and agnostics---and a knowledgeable commentator will be very helpful in explaining the Buddha's agreements and disagreements with his neighbors.
THE INDIVIDUAL SUTTAS
====================
THE FIVE AGGREGATES
====================
Anyone who is familiar with the Sutta Pitaka will know the Buddha was a person of many talents and knowledgeable in the many ways of the world. Most of all he was a down-to-earth person and it is from this standpoint I would like to discuss the Buddha as a psychologist whose knowledge of the human mind lay the foundation for his ethical views. Finally, the discussion will lead to the Buddha's change from an empiricist to a person representing a cosmic principle in the transformation of Buddhism from its original form [Theravada] to its later form [Mahayana].
It is appropriate to begin with the suttas on the person since the Buddha's "...supreme quest..." was for "...the extinction of pain and suffering...(EBO p. 109)" in human existence. The immediate question arising is "where to begin, where to look for the causes of human pain and suffering?" On the one hand, the Hindus and Jains said to look to the soul for the source of human suffering. Others, including certain materialists, said causality is completely random, it's a waste of time to search for causes. A philosopher who saw the weaknesses in the arguments of his opponents, the Buddha felt they were either misdirecting their efforts or not making any effort at all. The place to look, he said, is within the Five Aggregates of Existence where the human is represented as an empirical sensing self as opposed to a transcendent or non-existent being. The causes of pain and suffering are dependently arisen, are not random and can be found nowhere outside of this Nama-Rupa [mind-body] relationship of the Five Aggregates [khandas]:
1. body
2. feeling
3. perception
4. mental formations [mental faculties and dispositions]
5. consciousness [Vinnana]
(Mahasatipathana DN ii. 307)
Is there anywhere that a more accurate description of a person is found than that defined by these Five Aggregates? It is a description absent of any kind of speculation. At first glance it may appear this is a very common description, that of separate mind [Nama] and body [Rupa]. However, there is no indication of separateness in the aggregates. The Buddha used the Nama-Rupa term merely for the sake of designation; he is not saying mind and body are two separate entities. For the Buddha, mind and body are not separable, the mind is the brain, it is not possible to have a mind without matter. Although matter without mind is found everywhere, mind without matter is nowhere found. But, this is exactly the common belief, mind operates apart from matter.
This is the reason many reports of near death experiences are easily accepted. For example, almost everyone has read or heard of those who claim their minds have left their bodies following a life threatening event such as a heart attack or an auto accident. In this state they claim they've been able to observe their unconscious bodies from above and other surrounding activities as well. This is not possible, according to the Buddha; the mind can't roam about independently of the body, separate from the body, making observations apart from the body. Without the body there is no mind and everything associated with the mind----feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness. The mind is completely bound to matter, you can't have mind without matter: "the body is material, impermanent, consciousness is bound to it, dependent upon it" (Samanaphala DN i. 77).
The Buddha not only had to deal with the perception the mind and body were separate entities, also with the perception the mind is somehow superior to the body. Most people feel that way, seeing the body subject to decay, change, destruction and the mind, on the other hand, a more enduring part of them. This, in spite of the fact, from the standpoint of human experience, "...bodies are experienced as enduring and change in the body imperceptible...." and the mind "...is experienced as being in perpetual flux... (CCPB p. 104)". Nevertheless, the mind is grasped, "This is mine, this I am, this is myself" (Uninstructed Nidanasamyutta Nidanavagga SN2. 94), i.e., the mind is considered the Self and it is cherished with the greatest affection. It was then undoubtedly a surprise to the Buddha's listeners when he differed with them quite sharply on this matter:
"It would be better, bhikkhus, for the uninstructed worldling to take as self this body composed of the four great elements rather than the mind. For what reason? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for one year, for two years, for three, four, five or ten years, for twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years, for a hundred years, or even longer. But that which is called 'mind' and 'mentality' and 'consciousness' arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night. Just as a monkey roaming through a forest grabs hold of one branch, lets that go and grabs another, then lets that go and grabs still another, so too that which is called 'mind' and 'mentality' and 'consciousness' arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night (Uninstructed Nidanasamyutta Nidanavagga SN2. 95)".
The Buddha's preference for the self being the body rather than the mind harkens back to his somewhat materialist model of a person---"earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness (Dhatuvibanga MN iii. 239)"---which is a sure sign of materialism's influence on the Buddha. The Uninstructed sutta is a lesson for the benefit of the "uninstructed worldling", a person new to the Buddha's teachings. It serves to reinforce the Buddha's major contention regarding the Five Aggregates:
"The Five Aggregates are impermanent, the Five Aggregates are without a soul" (Impermanent Khandasamyutta Khandavagga SN3.46)
The Uninstructed explains the body and mind changes at different rates and implies what the Samyutta Nikaya contends: because change is occurring, the Five Aggregates are impermanent and because the Five Aggregates are impermanent, it could not harbor a permanent soul. Most of all, the Uninstructed criticizes the idea of mind as soul. The Buddha's criticism, of course, would in turn be challenged by soul supporters. In this contest, the Five Aggregates remains the Buddha's primary definition of a person, he will return to it over and over again in the suttas to refute the belief in an eternal self.
Roles of the Senses
==============
Any discussion on the Five Aggregates should include the roles of the senses, for, according to David Kalupahana, when saying anything about a person, one must say something about sense experience. In fact, to say anything more about a person than what is given or learned in sense experience would be to incorrectly define a person. Thus, the Buddha's primary description of a person, the Five Aggregates of Existence [Khandas] consists of only 1) body, 2) feeling, 3) perception, 4) mental formations, 5) consciousness [Vinnana] (Mahasatipatthana DN ii. 307). Notice, a soul is not included among the Five Aggregates since sense experience has never confirmed the existence of a soul. Nor does the major characteristic of the Three Characteristics of Existence, Impermanence, allow for the existence of a permanent, eternal soul.
In this way a person is defined by Buddhism as nothing more or less than an empirical self, an experiencer of the senses who is devoid of a soul. While there is no need in Buddhism to verify the existence of a soul, it is necessary for Buddhism to verify the roles of the senses when making their claims. The reason is Buddhism relies on "...sense data [phassa or sanna]...[as]...the primary sources of our knowledge and understanding of the world (BP p. 20)".
Among these sense sources, the five physical senses are easily identified, all of them familiar to everyone. However, when a sixth sense, the mind, is added to the category of senses, the welcome mat is withdrawn by many. The mind is unique these people say, it could not be just one of the senses. Yes, the mind is unique among the senses, still, the mind is also only one of the senses. The mind [brain] is as much a sense organ as is any of the other sense organs. Confident this is the case, the Buddha does not hesitate to include mind [brain] as a sense organ along with the five physical senses.
A rendering of the roles of the senses are found in the Eighteen Elements [dhatus] Sutta (Dhatusamyutta Niddanavagga SN2. 140 Diversity of Elements):
Sense Organ Sense Object Sense Consciousness
======== ========= ==============
Eye Form Visual Consciousness
Ear Sound Auditory Consciousness
Nose Smell Olfactory Consciousness
Tongue Taste Gustatory Consciousness
Body Tactile Body Consciousness
Mind [brain] Mental Phenomena Mind Consciousness
(SN2. 140, PBP p. 30)
The classification of these Eighteen Elements are in total the three initial and primary components of all sense experience. These three categories are of 1) the sense organs, 2) their objects and 3) their related consciousness. For example, in the case of the organ of the eye, its object is material form, its related consciousness is visual consciousness; similarly equivalent relationships continues on with respect to the remaining senses.
Although the mind sense is only one of six senses, it is distinct from the physical senses. It has "the ability to survey the fields [gocara] or the objects of the other senses (PBP p. 30)" an ability not shared by any of the other senses. Unlike the five physical senses, none of which has any contact with any other, mind sense has a relationship with all of the senses. Through its relationships with the physical senses, their objects and their consciousnesses, mind sense has the important role of supplying for Vinnana the sense data of human experience. Although mind consciousness is often used synonymously with Vinnana, in the Eighteen Elements Sutta it is used only as a sense function.
This description of mind sense indicates mind [sense] consciousness is not completely synonymous with the consciousness [Vinnana] of the Five Aggregates. Mind consciousness is only one of six sense consciousnesses, therefore, it is not synonymous with Vinnana. Vinnana is the "Stream of Consciousness" connecting two lives (Sampasadaniya DN iii. 105, BP p. 52, PBP p. 24), it is the equivalent of Kamma itself. In these ways, mind [sense] consciousness, physical consciousness and Vinnana, the Stream of Consciousness, are each distinct from each other.
Nama-Rupa (Mind-Body)
==================
Nama Rupa approximates the Five Aggregates. The Eighteen Elements does not because mind [sense] consciousness is not synonymous with Vinnana (PBP p. 29). In the Eighteen Elements mind consciousness is used only as a sense function although Vinnana has many other functions in addition to sense function.
The Buddha refrained from speaking of mind and body or mind and matter as two separate entities (PBP p. 15). However, this is the common belief for most people in the world. Most would just think, "How could it be otherwise?"
Just as common a belief is a belief in "mind and material stuffs (PBP p. 16)". How would one come to such a belief? The only way a person would be aware of a body or mind is through human experience. How would you know you had a body without the experience of heat, cold, hunger, pleasure, pain (Being Devoured SN iii. 86)? How would you know you had a mind without the experience of perceiving, conceiving or reasoning? Thus, for the Buddha matter is "contact with resistance (PBP p. 16, DN iii. 224)" and mind is "contact with concepts (PBP p.16, Madhupindika MN i. 112)". "In doing so, he was reducing both mind and matter to contact [samphassa] and, therefore, processes of experience rather than any kind of material-stuff or mind-stuff (PBP p. 16)".
It is only a short step away to define the body and mind as processes of experience once a person is seen as the experiencer of the senses. It is true people may then separate the body and mind into two separate experiences. However, if the mind and body are defined as processes of experience rather than mind and material stuffs, people will not have the opportunity to introduce a body substance, a separate mind substance or an unifying soul substance into the definition of a person.
This example of visual sense perception is only one of six sense perceptions. The others are touch, smell, hearing, taste and mind. Human experience "begins" when the sense organ, sense object and the resulting sense consciousness meet in what is called contact. Several assumptions comes with contact [experience]:
1. First, there is no "self" or "agent" involved in human experience, there is only the principle of "dependence" at work.
2. The presence of the sense organ emphasizes experience occurs in a "psychophysical" personality.
3. The sense organ and sense object are both equally important. The sense object must be compatible with the sense organ otherwise the sense object will not be perceived. In their relationship, the emphasis is not on the ultimate nature of the object, but, on what a reflective human makes of the object.
4. The dependence of sense consciousness on the sense organ and sense object indicates human perspective is unavoidable in sense consciousness. (HBP p, 32, 33)
1. body
2. feeling
3. perception
4. mental formations [mental faculties and dispositions]
5. consciousness [Vinnana]
(Mahasatipathana DN ii. 307)
Is there anywhere that a more accurate description of a person is found than that defined by these Five Aggregates? It is a description absent of any kind of speculation. At first glance it may appear this is a very common description, that of separate mind [Nama] and body [Rupa]. However, there is no indication of separateness in the aggregates. The Buddha used the Nama-Rupa term merely for the sake of designation; he is not saying mind and body are two separate entities. For the Buddha, mind and body are not separable, the mind is the brain, it is not possible to have a mind without matter. Although matter without mind is found everywhere, mind without matter is nowhere found. But, this is exactly the common belief, mind operates apart from matter.
This is the reason many reports of near death experiences are easily accepted. For example, almost everyone has read or heard of those who claim their minds have left their bodies following a life threatening event such as a heart attack or an auto accident. In this state they claim they've been able to observe their unconscious bodies from above and other surrounding activities as well. This is not possible, according to the Buddha; the mind can't roam about independently of the body, separate from the body, making observations apart from the body. Without the body there is no mind and everything associated with the mind----feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness. The mind is completely bound to matter, you can't have mind without matter: "the body is material, impermanent, consciousness is bound to it, dependent upon it" (Samanaphala DN i. 77).
The Buddha not only had to deal with the perception the mind and body were separate entities, also with the perception the mind is somehow superior to the body. Most people feel that way, seeing the body subject to decay, change, destruction and the mind, on the other hand, a more enduring part of them. This, in spite of the fact, from the standpoint of human experience, "...bodies are experienced as enduring and change in the body imperceptible...." and the mind "...is experienced as being in perpetual flux... (CCPB p. 104)". Nevertheless, the mind is grasped, "This is mine, this I am, this is myself" (Uninstructed Nidanasamyutta Nidanavagga SN2. 94), i.e., the mind is considered the Self and it is cherished with the greatest affection. It was then undoubtedly a surprise to the Buddha's listeners when he differed with them quite sharply on this matter:
"It would be better, bhikkhus, for the uninstructed worldling to take as self this body composed of the four great elements rather than the mind. For what reason? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for one year, for two years, for three, four, five or ten years, for twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years, for a hundred years, or even longer. But that which is called 'mind' and 'mentality' and 'consciousness' arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night. Just as a monkey roaming through a forest grabs hold of one branch, lets that go and grabs another, then lets that go and grabs still another, so too that which is called 'mind' and 'mentality' and 'consciousness' arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night (Uninstructed Nidanasamyutta Nidanavagga SN2. 95)".
The Buddha's preference for the self being the body rather than the mind harkens back to his somewhat materialist model of a person---"earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness (Dhatuvibanga MN iii. 239)"---which is a sure sign of materialism's influence on the Buddha. The Uninstructed sutta is a lesson for the benefit of the "uninstructed worldling", a person new to the Buddha's teachings. It serves to reinforce the Buddha's major contention regarding the Five Aggregates:
"The Five Aggregates are impermanent, the Five Aggregates are without a soul" (Impermanent Khandasamyutta Khandavagga SN3.46)
The Uninstructed explains the body and mind changes at different rates and implies what the Samyutta Nikaya contends: because change is occurring, the Five Aggregates are impermanent and because the Five Aggregates are impermanent, it could not harbor a permanent soul. Most of all, the Uninstructed criticizes the idea of mind as soul. The Buddha's criticism, of course, would in turn be challenged by soul supporters. In this contest, the Five Aggregates remains the Buddha's primary definition of a person, he will return to it over and over again in the suttas to refute the belief in an eternal self.
Roles of the Senses
==============
Any discussion on the Five Aggregates should include the roles of the senses, for, according to David Kalupahana, when saying anything about a person, one must say something about sense experience. In fact, to say anything more about a person than what is given or learned in sense experience would be to incorrectly define a person. Thus, the Buddha's primary description of a person, the Five Aggregates of Existence [Khandas] consists of only 1) body, 2) feeling, 3) perception, 4) mental formations, 5) consciousness [Vinnana] (Mahasatipatthana DN ii. 307). Notice, a soul is not included among the Five Aggregates since sense experience has never confirmed the existence of a soul. Nor does the major characteristic of the Three Characteristics of Existence, Impermanence, allow for the existence of a permanent, eternal soul.
In this way a person is defined by Buddhism as nothing more or less than an empirical self, an experiencer of the senses who is devoid of a soul. While there is no need in Buddhism to verify the existence of a soul, it is necessary for Buddhism to verify the roles of the senses when making their claims. The reason is Buddhism relies on "...sense data [phassa or sanna]...[as]...the primary sources of our knowledge and understanding of the world (BP p. 20)".
Among these sense sources, the five physical senses are easily identified, all of them familiar to everyone. However, when a sixth sense, the mind, is added to the category of senses, the welcome mat is withdrawn by many. The mind is unique these people say, it could not be just one of the senses. Yes, the mind is unique among the senses, still, the mind is also only one of the senses. The mind [brain] is as much a sense organ as is any of the other sense organs. Confident this is the case, the Buddha does not hesitate to include mind [brain] as a sense organ along with the five physical senses.
A rendering of the roles of the senses are found in the Eighteen Elements [dhatus] Sutta (Dhatusamyutta Niddanavagga SN2. 140 Diversity of Elements):
Sense Organ Sense Object Sense Consciousness
======== ========= ==============
Eye Form Visual Consciousness
Ear Sound Auditory Consciousness
Nose Smell Olfactory Consciousness
Tongue Taste Gustatory Consciousness
Body Tactile Body Consciousness
Mind [brain] Mental Phenomena Mind Consciousness
(SN2. 140, PBP p. 30)
The classification of these Eighteen Elements are in total the three initial and primary components of all sense experience. These three categories are of 1) the sense organs, 2) their objects and 3) their related consciousness. For example, in the case of the organ of the eye, its object is material form, its related consciousness is visual consciousness; similarly equivalent relationships continues on with respect to the remaining senses.
Although the mind sense is only one of six senses, it is distinct from the physical senses. It has "the ability to survey the fields [gocara] or the objects of the other senses (PBP p. 30)" an ability not shared by any of the other senses. Unlike the five physical senses, none of which has any contact with any other, mind sense has a relationship with all of the senses. Through its relationships with the physical senses, their objects and their consciousnesses, mind sense has the important role of supplying for Vinnana the sense data of human experience. Although mind consciousness is often used synonymously with Vinnana, in the Eighteen Elements Sutta it is used only as a sense function.
This description of mind sense indicates mind [sense] consciousness is not completely synonymous with the consciousness [Vinnana] of the Five Aggregates. Mind consciousness is only one of six sense consciousnesses, therefore, it is not synonymous with Vinnana. Vinnana is the "Stream of Consciousness" connecting two lives (Sampasadaniya DN iii. 105, BP p. 52, PBP p. 24), it is the equivalent of Kamma itself. In these ways, mind [sense] consciousness, physical consciousness and Vinnana, the Stream of Consciousness, are each distinct from each other.
Nama-Rupa (Mind-Body)
==================
Nama Rupa approximates the Five Aggregates. The Eighteen Elements does not because mind [sense] consciousness is not synonymous with Vinnana (PBP p. 29). In the Eighteen Elements mind consciousness is used only as a sense function although Vinnana has many other functions in addition to sense function.
The Buddha refrained from speaking of mind and body or mind and matter as two separate entities (PBP p. 15). However, this is the common belief for most people in the world. Most would just think, "How could it be otherwise?"
Just as common a belief is a belief in "mind and material stuffs (PBP p. 16)". How would one come to such a belief? The only way a person would be aware of a body or mind is through human experience. How would you know you had a body without the experience of heat, cold, hunger, pleasure, pain (Being Devoured SN iii. 86)? How would you know you had a mind without the experience of perceiving, conceiving or reasoning? Thus, for the Buddha matter is "contact with resistance (PBP p. 16, DN iii. 224)" and mind is "contact with concepts (PBP p.16, Madhupindika MN i. 112)". "In doing so, he was reducing both mind and matter to contact [samphassa] and, therefore, processes of experience rather than any kind of material-stuff or mind-stuff (PBP p. 16)".
It is only a short step away to define the body and mind as processes of experience once a person is seen as the experiencer of the senses. It is true people may then separate the body and mind into two separate experiences. However, if the mind and body are defined as processes of experience rather than mind and material stuffs, people will not have the opportunity to introduce a body substance, a separate mind substance or an unifying soul substance into the definition of a person.
THE MADHUPINDIKA SUTTA
========================
While the Five Aggregates gives an empirical description of a person, the Madhupindika Sutta provides an empirical description of the mind of a human. The Madhupindika Sutta is a sutta of great importance as it it explains how from the workings of the mind are produced "evil and unwholesome" human behavior. Most of all, it seems to explain how from the mind emerges the "pure egotism" of the soul. The craving and attachment characterizing egotism are the primary reasons the Buddha was so greatly opposed to the belief in a soul.
The Madhupindika Sutta opens with this question, "Why is there so much rancor in the world arising from disputes over all manner of gods, different economic and governing systems, cultural and racial differences? " The Buddha's answer to this question is, these disputes are caused by an underlying tendency to views, to lust, to aversion, to conceit, doubt, ignorance. Very frequently these tendencies in turn lead to "...resorting to rods and weapons...quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice and false speech...(Madhupindika MN1. 110)".
Certainly tendencies leading to "resorting to rods and weapons" are particularly "evil and unwholesome" taints, consequently they deserve the greatest attention. The Budha agreed and being the empiricist that he was, immediately turned his attention to the senses.
Earlier, in the Eighteen Elements Sutta (SN2 .140, PBP p. 30), he did categorize the three initial and primary components of sense experience---Sense Organ, Sense Object and Sense Consciousness. While these components do provide fundamental information on the senses, it is the Madhupindika Sutta [the Honeyball] which explains why human behavior includes "resorting to rods and weapons". Each of the senses plays a role when these things happen. The organ of the eye is the first sense organ examined in the Madhupindika. The roles of the remaining sense organs are described in later passages:
1) Depending upon the visual sense and the visible object, O brethren,
Earlier, in the Eighteen Elements Sutta (SN2 .140, PBP p. 30), he did categorize the three initial and primary components of sense experience---Sense Organ, Sense Object and Sense Consciousness. While these components do provide fundamental information on the senses, it is the Madhupindika Sutta [the Honeyball] which explains why human behavior includes "resorting to rods and weapons". Each of the senses plays a role when these things happen. The organ of the eye is the first sense organ examined in the Madhupindika. The roles of the remaining sense organs are described in later passages:
1) Depending upon the visual sense and the visible object, O brethren,
arises visual consciousness; the coming together of these three is
contact [experience]; depending upon contact arises feeling.
2) What one feels one perceives; what one perceives one reasons
about. What one reasons about, one is obsessed with.
3) Due to such obsessions, a person is assailed by obsessed
perceptions and concepts in regard to visible objects cognizable by
the visual sense, belonging to the past, the future and the
present (Madhupindika MN1. 111, EEB p. 40).
This example of visual sense perception is only one of six sense perceptions. The others are touch, smell, hearing, taste and mind. Human experience "begins" when the sense organ, sense object and the resulting sense consciousness meet in what is called contact. Several assumptions comes with contact [experience]:
1. First, there is no "self" or "agent" involved in human experience, there is only the principle of "dependence" at work.
2. The presence of the sense organ emphasizes experience occurs in a "psychophysical" personality.
3. The sense organ and sense object are both equally important. The sense object must be compatible with the sense organ otherwise the sense object will not be perceived. In their relationship, the emphasis is not on the ultimate nature of the object, but, on what a reflective human makes of the object.
4. The dependence of sense consciousness on the sense organ and sense object indicates human perspective is unavoidable in sense consciousness. (HBP p, 32, 33)
When contact occurs its "inevitable result...is feeling [vedana] (HBP p. 33)". Feeling is inevitable as it is one of the Five Aggregates [khandas] and is originally a part of the mind. If the mind were originally a "tabula rasa" [John Locke's notion of the mind as a blank sheet] the varied feelings of pleasantness, unpleasantness or neutrality (HBP p. 33)" could not result as contended by the Buddha.
The "I", the major obstacle to the good and peaceful, appears in the Buddha's beginning of sense perception [parts 1) and 2)] in the form of feeling. In every case of sense perception, the belief in the "I" or "soul" arises in feeling. We believe we have a soul because we FEEL we have a soul. Feeling arises from contact and is present in perception, but, it does not alter the natural process of perception. It remains for the reflection of reasoning and conception for the full blown obsessions of an immortal soul to appear. Notice, the process of sense perception begins very objectively, but, once feeling arrives, the process turns purely subjective and egotistical: "What ONE feels, that ONE perceives". Here, entering on this grand stage is the Soul or Pure Ego arising straight out of feeling. Here is answered the question "Why do we believe in a soul?" It is because we FEEL there is a soul, a feeling buttressed by pure egotism. Does this mean feeling is a problem and should be eliminated? This proposal is not a solution at all, when you consider all human decision making is dependent on feelings.
Feeling is something we have to deal with. Feeling itself is not at fault here, it is our craving and attachment for a metaphysical soul, embedded in feeling, which leads to the perception of a soul. Remember, feeling is one of the five aggregates [khandas], a major component of a person. Feeling is a vital characteristic of a person since "For the Buddha, the emotive aspect of sense experience is most important because it enables him to ground moral decisions in the world of experience instead of leaving them as arbitrary decisions unrelated to the factual world (HBP p. 33)".
Finally, this is what an absolutist or transcendentalist believes, the soul is the ultimate experiencer of all that a human experiences. However, notice the Buddha begins his formula of sense experience with the word "Depending". This means the Buddhist principle according to which sense experience begins to take place is not with a soul, but, with the principle of "dependence or dependent arising [paticcasamppada] or causality". This also means the conception of a "self [atman]" that functions as the agent is thereby eliminated (HBP p. 32) for a soul is eternal, never dependent on anything else. Buddhist causality [paticcasamupadda] will be discussed more fully shortly.
This is the problem with human sense experience---reasoning becomes obsessed with the idea of an immortal soul and such a conception thereafter colors all experience. Buddhism's solution to this problem is direct and to the point: make every effort to appease these obsessions, or, as chatgpt puts it, seek the liberation from conceptual error. The Buddha saw the appeasement of obsessions as an ethical problem and proceeded to treat it as such. However, the ethical stance the Buddha took faced great opposition from his competitors and opponents. His arguments and those of his opponents are found in the debates in the following Fact-Value Distinction. [Before addressing the Fact-Value Distinction topic and leaving the Madhupindika and the human mind it's time to take a closer look at the least understood part of the human mind, human consciousness.]
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
=====================
Science decided long ago its only occupation should be matter. Human consciousness belonged to the soul and was not an appropriate subject of inquiry. All of the major Indian philosophies---Hinduism/Brahmanism, Jainism and Buddhism---disagreed and proceeded to accomplish a major objective, the removal of human suffering ******to be continued*****
THE FACT VALUE DISTINCTION
==========================
"One of the most difficult problems a student of ethics, whether Eastern or Western, has to face is the royal pair of dichotomies, fact and value, that has haunted philosophers for centuries (EEB p. 37)." With these words, David Kalupahana begins his beautiful examination into The Fact-Value Distinction in his Ethics in Early Buddhism. With the greatest of scholarship and insight, he manages to almost get into the mind of the Buddha and see how the Buddha looked at this problem. Most of all, in addressing this problem, the Buddha relied on his knowledge of the human mind and sense experience to which he applied empirical psychology, something no one else had ever done in the history of philosophy. Eventually, he came to use his knowledge as a way to a way to avoid the fact-value distinction (EEB p. 40).
Long before the arrival of Buddhism in India, Indian philosophers, as did the later rationalists of the western world, the Greeks, make the same fact-value distinction. The search of the Greeks was a similar deductive search , the search for certainty. Empirical knowledge was not a factor in this search (EEB p. 37).
The conclusions of the Indians and Greeks were the same: facts are facts because facts are objective, "facts are the given, the real and the ultimate (EEB p. 38)" and are subject to precise physical laws. Accordingly, the fact category includes mathematics and its tautological partners, logic, and science. On the other hand, "values being human fabrications or products of human convention, cannot be subjected to strict formulations (EEB p. 38)" and therefore are subjective. In this way, the materialistically inclined "rejected values as part of the factual world (EEB p. 38)". These views were also held by "...the materialistically inclined empiricists, both classical and modern, Eastern and Western (EEB p. 38)."
This arrangement was a problem for the Buddha since among the not credibles were ethics, psychology and aesthetics. Centuries after the Greeks, western philosophers continued to include in facts only "ideas that correspond to objective physical reality. Moral discourse...was no more than an expression of emotion and was without positive philosophical content (EEB p. 38)". Any idea that did not fall into...this watertight absolute compartment was rejected as being metaphysical and meaningless (EEB p. 38)". This was the challenge the Buddha faced, the definition of facts as absolute, "ungenerated and imperishable (EEB p. 39)". The Buddha's response to this challenge was one unimagined by his competitors and opponents.
It was unimagined in the minds of the Buddha's opponents and competitors because knowledge of the mind and its relation to the senses was absent in their world, nor, had they any inkling of empirical psychology. Thus, the line of the Fact-Value rivalry would be drawn: the Fact camp's obsession with absolutism would need to face the Value arguments of Buddhist relativism.
==========================
"One of the most difficult problems a student of ethics, whether Eastern or Western, has to face is the royal pair of dichotomies, fact and value, that has haunted philosophers for centuries (EEB p. 37)." With these words, David Kalupahana begins his beautiful examination into The Fact-Value Distinction in his Ethics in Early Buddhism. With the greatest of scholarship and insight, he manages to almost get into the mind of the Buddha and see how the Buddha looked at this problem. Most of all, in addressing this problem, the Buddha relied on his knowledge of the human mind and sense experience to which he applied empirical psychology, something no one else had ever done in the history of philosophy. Eventually, he came to use his knowledge as a way to a way to avoid the fact-value distinction (EEB p. 40).
Long before the arrival of Buddhism in India, Indian philosophers, as did the later rationalists of the western world, the Greeks, make the same fact-value distinction. The search of the Greeks was a similar deductive search , the search for certainty. Empirical knowledge was not a factor in this search (EEB p. 37).
The conclusions of the Indians and Greeks were the same: facts are facts because facts are objective, "facts are the given, the real and the ultimate (EEB p. 38)" and are subject to precise physical laws. Accordingly, the fact category includes mathematics and its tautological partners, logic, and science. On the other hand, "values being human fabrications or products of human convention, cannot be subjected to strict formulations (EEB p. 38)" and therefore are subjective. In this way, the materialistically inclined "rejected values as part of the factual world (EEB p. 38)". These views were also held by "...the materialistically inclined empiricists, both classical and modern, Eastern and Western (EEB p. 38)."
This arrangement was a problem for the Buddha since among the not credibles were ethics, psychology and aesthetics. Centuries after the Greeks, western philosophers continued to include in facts only "ideas that correspond to objective physical reality. Moral discourse...was no more than an expression of emotion and was without positive philosophical content (EEB p. 38)". Any idea that did not fall into...this watertight absolute compartment was rejected as being metaphysical and meaningless (EEB p. 38)". This was the challenge the Buddha faced, the definition of facts as absolute, "ungenerated and imperishable (EEB p. 39)". The Buddha's response to this challenge was one unimagined by his competitors and opponents.
It was unimagined in the minds of the Buddha's opponents and competitors because knowledge of the mind and its relation to the senses was absent in their world, nor, had they any inkling of empirical psychology. Thus, the line of the Fact-Value rivalry would be drawn: the Fact camp's obsession with absolutism would need to face the Value arguments of Buddhist relativism.
The Dominance of Absolutism
=======================
The Indian and Greek absolutists all felt they held winning hands as world-wide relativism "...is generally frowned upon in ethics (HBP p. 102)" and even too in science, mathematics and logic. Not so for the Buddha. His confident support of impermanence would not allow absolute right and wrong to take a foothold in Buddhist ethics. Absolutism could not find a grip where impermanence ruled, only relative knowledge is compatible with impermanence. Of course no one agreed, especially the Greeks, whom, according to Mortimer Adler, certainly frowned upon relativism:
Without explicitly realizing it, most persons who are relativists and subjectivists about values of every kind embrace a single-minded hedonism. When individuals place positive or negative values on whatever objects they are considering, they are simply saying what pleases or displeases them. Since what pleases one individual may not please another, and since what pleases a given individual at one time may not please him or her at another, their evaluations will vary from one individual to another, and from one time to another (Desires Right & Wrong-Mortimer Adler p. 12).
=======================
The Indian and Greek absolutists all felt they held winning hands as world-wide relativism "...is generally frowned upon in ethics (HBP p. 102)" and even too in science, mathematics and logic. Not so for the Buddha. His confident support of impermanence would not allow absolute right and wrong to take a foothold in Buddhist ethics. Absolutism could not find a grip where impermanence ruled, only relative knowledge is compatible with impermanence. Of course no one agreed, especially the Greeks, whom, according to Mortimer Adler, certainly frowned upon relativism:
Without explicitly realizing it, most persons who are relativists and subjectivists about values of every kind embrace a single-minded hedonism. When individuals place positive or negative values on whatever objects they are considering, they are simply saying what pleases or displeases them. Since what pleases one individual may not please another, and since what pleases a given individual at one time may not please him or her at another, their evaluations will vary from one individual to another, and from one time to another (Desires Right & Wrong-Mortimer Adler p. 12).
Aristotle, the foremost of the ancient Greek ethecists, was an absolutist firmly rooted in the objective fact camp of the physical which he saw as incorruptible, imperishable and eternal. All the conclusions of science are absolute as these conclusions must obey absolute physical laws. So too with the partners of science, mathematics and logic. Thus he shied away from formulating any moral principles (EEB p. 39)." The incorruptible belonged "in the spheres of science and logic, not in morals". Furthermore, truth can only be found in facts, subjective value is unable to offer any evidence of truth. This Aristotle asserts in the following two passages:
Aristotle, concluded in his Nicomachean Ethics, that the falsity or truthfulness of objective facts can be determined. On the other hand, the subjectivity of values does not allow any such determination in the assessment of values. Herein lies the fact-value distinction which has occupied philosophers for centuries (EEB p. 38).
Aristotle, concluded in his Nicomachean Ethics, that the falsity or truthfulness of objective facts can be determined. On the other hand, the subjectivity of values does not allow any such determination in the assessment of values. Herein lies the fact-value distinction which has occupied philosophers for centuries (EEB p. 38).
Aristotle asks "If truth lies in the correspondence of our descriptive [fact] judgements about what is or is not with the way things are or are not, how can there be any truth in prescriptive [value] judgements that state what ought or ought not be done or sought? (Desires Right & Wrong-Mortimer Adler p. 7).
Like Aristotle and the Greeks, David Hume, a British philosopher centuries later could find no solace in the subjectivity of values and simply rejected ethics as "unsupportable opinion":
"...if we had complete knowledge of all matters of fact, we could not validly reason from that knowledge to a single prescriptive [value] conclusion---a statement containing the words "ought" or "ought not". Hence such prescriptive judgments can have no rational basis whatsoever. This of course, is another way of saying that there is no way to assess the truth or falsity of moral judgements. Hence they must be relegated to the realm of unsupportable opinion. Ethics, therefore, is not a science, not a body of verifiable knowledge (Desires Right and Wrong p. 13 Mortimer Adler)."
Like Aristotle and the Greeks, David Hume, a British philosopher centuries later could find no solace in the subjectivity of values and simply rejected ethics as "unsupportable opinion":
"...if we had complete knowledge of all matters of fact, we could not validly reason from that knowledge to a single prescriptive [value] conclusion---a statement containing the words "ought" or "ought not". Hence such prescriptive judgments can have no rational basis whatsoever. This of course, is another way of saying that there is no way to assess the truth or falsity of moral judgements. Hence they must be relegated to the realm of unsupportable opinion. Ethics, therefore, is not a science, not a body of verifiable knowledge (Desires Right and Wrong p. 13 Mortimer Adler)."
Mortimer Adler points out and David Hume states ethical opinion is nothing but "unsupportable opinion". For the Buddha, the Adler and Hume opinions are unsupportable because their opinions originate from the height of subjectivity, the "I". From the "I" or "soul" or "self" emerges our prejudices, our likes [rucci] and dislikes [arucci], all rooted in craving and attachment. Therein lies the problem thought the Buddha.
David Hume did not have much confidence in knowledge as a way to answer ethical questions. The same could not be said of the Buddha. After all, he was a person who placed knowledge at the head of his ethical path, the Noble Eightfold Path. This means the Buddha's concept of knowledge and Hume's were very different. Like Aristotle, Hume was in search of absolute knowledge "where the truth lies."
The Buddha was not an absolutist. The absolutists could not but help produce misguided conceptions about the subjective and relative simply because they were absolutists. In search of the good and the peaceful the Buddha found himself squarely in the value camp of subjectivity, led there by his ethical and moral views. Now, let us see how the non-absolutist Buddha creatively fashions the role of Buddhist relativity to serve an impermanent world. He begins with the experience of his Enlightenment where in it he discovered the Dhamma:
David Hume did not have much confidence in knowledge as a way to answer ethical questions. The same could not be said of the Buddha. After all, he was a person who placed knowledge at the head of his ethical path, the Noble Eightfold Path. This means the Buddha's concept of knowledge and Hume's were very different. Like Aristotle, Hume was in search of absolute knowledge "where the truth lies."
The Buddha was not an absolutist. The absolutists could not but help produce misguided conceptions about the subjective and relative simply because they were absolutists. In search of the good and the peaceful the Buddha found himself squarely in the value camp of subjectivity, led there by his ethical and moral views. Now, let us see how the non-absolutist Buddha creatively fashions the role of Buddhist relativity to serve an impermanent world. He begins with the experience of his Enlightenment where in it he discovered the Dhamma:
It occurred to me that I have discovered this dhamma, profound, difficult to see, difficult to comprehend, peaceful, excellent, beyond the sphere of logic, subtle and to be understood by the wise. These people are devoted to their likes (alaya), deeply engrossed with their likes, and nourished by their likes. For those who are devoted to their likes, engrossed with their likes, and nourished by their likes, this fact, namely relativity (idappaccayata/specific conditionality) or causality (paticcasamuppada) is difficult to comprehend (BP p. 155, MN1. 167).
Dependent Arising [Paticcasamuppada]
============================
In his enlightenment, the Buddha learned of the dhamma and also learned relativity is the equivalent of causality (BP p. 155, MN1. 167). This means causality is not absolute, it is not deterministic nor indeterministic; causality is impermanent and always subject to change and alteration. For those in the Fact camp, including Aristotle and the materialists, causality is, on the other hand, an absolute fact producing "natural" laws which are unchanging and eternal. Where the Buddha saw causality an ethical issue belonging to the Value camp, it was impossible for the absolutists to accept ethics into their fact camp, ethical issues being incomprehensible to the absolutists who are devoted to their likes. Thus, the line was clearly drawn between the absolutists in the Fact camp who saw causality as absolute and the supporters of the Dhamma, those in the Value camp who saw causality an ethical issue subject to change.
In defense of his view that everything is dependently arisen the Buddha began his discussion on causal relations with its nominal title, Dependent Arising. Dependent Arising is explained to the monks in the Samyutta Nikaya through two concepts---(1) causality [paticcasamppada] and (2) causally conditioned phenomena [paticcasamuppanna dhamma] (BP p. 26):
"Bhikkhus, I will teach you dependent origination and dependently arisen phenomena. Listen and attend closely, I will speak (Conditions SN2. 25)"
"These two concepts, according to the Buddha, explain everything in this world, the individual things and the relations existing among them (BP p. 26)". "Explain everything?" A bold statement some would say. It is a bold statement in the sense the Buddha did not hesitate to say things uncomfortable to many. However, it will not sound so much a bold statement as a sensible statement once the listener understands the Buddha is speaking only of that we can experience through the senses, not anything otherwise. Both of these concepts are related or relative, neither are absolute.
Prior to and during the Buddha's time, there were three major theories of causality, none of them arrived at solely through sensory knowledge, all of them assuming the existence of soul, a Creator God and divine laws:
1) Self-causation - reality of self (atman) substantialist theory accepted by Brahmins/Hindus
2) External causation - Naturalist theory, 'inherent nature' (svabhava), denied man's moral responsibility
3) Combination of above causation theories - believed by Jains
(BP p. 26, 27)
Buddhist dependent arising applies to physical causality as well as all the causality involved in "...psychic, moral, social and spiritual realms (BP p. 27)". In this way it differed from the theory of self-causation "which denied the causal efficacy of any factor outside the 'self' due to the activity of a principle immanent in everything [sarvam] (BP p. 26)". It differed also from the naturalist theory "which subordinat[ed] everything to physical causation and claimed inherent nature [svabhava] is strictly determined and that nothing can change the course of nature (BP p. 27). The belief in external causation also means man has no moral responsibility. Of course, the combination of these theories, as practiced by the Jains, is unacceptable to Buddhist causality.
The "Discourse on Causal Relations (BP p. 27, Conditions SN2. 25)" describes the four characteristics of Dependent Arising distinguishing it from other causal theories:
1) objectivity [tathata], 2) necessity [avitathata], 3) invariability [anannathata] and 4) conditionality [idappaccayata] (BP p. 27).
The Samyutta Nikaya's description of objectivity is---whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists (Conditions SN2. 25). What that means is whether Buddhas arise or do not arise Dependent Arising is an objective fact of existence. It also says Dependent Arising is as objective as any science is.
The following two characteristics, 2) necessity and 3) invariability "stress the lack of exception or the existence of regularity. The fact that a certain set of conditions gives rise to a certain effect and not to something completely different, is one of the basic assumptions of the causal principle (BP p. 28)". This sounds very much like scientific experimentation where certain causes should produce the same effects repeatedly. It also sounds like the method of reasoning applied is the reasoning of science, deductive reasoning.
The fourth characteristic, conditionality, is the most important as it distinguishes Dependent Arising from all the other causal theories including scientific causation. The Samyutta Nikaya's (SN2. 25) description of conditionality as "specific conditionality" is the most precise, as Buddhist causality applies not only to the physical but the "...psychic, moral, social and spiritual realms (BP p. 27)". Because Buddhist causality applies to anything affecting the world and the self, Buddhist causality is specific to the effect it produces.
Based upon these characteristics the Buddha created this general formula:
Thus when this exists, that comes to be;
with the arising of this, that arises.
When this does not exist, that does not come to be;
with the cessation of this, that ceases.
(The Ten Powers SN2. 28, BP p. 28)
"This formula...came to be known as the golden mean between the two extremes, eternalism and annihilationism...the truth about the world...which became the 'central' doctrine of Buddhism (BP p. 29)". The demonstratives "this" represents the past, "that" represents the present. In this way the Buddha connected the present to the immediate past, thus creating Buddhist causality, Dependent Arising. Previously the present was conceptualized in Indian tradition by the word "vartamana" a sanskrit word without any relation to the past.
Additionally, unlike scientific causality, the reasoning applied in the Four Characteristics and Ten Power formulas is not deductive reasoning but inductive reasoning. While causation [paticcasamppada] itself is a phenomenon experienced, causal uniformity [paticcasamuppanna dhamma] is considered an inductive inference. While the present is experienced immediately, the past can be recollected, although human memory is not always reliable and inductive inference is required for the past to be recalled. Hence even knowledge of the past is based partly on inductive inference, but, knowledge of the future can be had only through inductive generalization (BP p. 29, 30).
Buddhist causality [paticcasamppada] nor causally conditioned phenomena [paticcasamuppanna dhamma] would not be operative were it not for the grouping known as the Three Characteristics of Existence---1) anicca [impermanence], 2) dukkha [suffering] and 3)anatta [non-self/non-subtantiality]. Because these are the characteristics of the world and the self and because everything is impermanent, change occurs. Thus Buddhist causality is able to operate in all the spheres of human experience. Because everything is impermanent, the existence of substance is not possible for substance is unchanging. When change occurs, very often this change results in human suffering. The Three Characteristics of Existence has been discussed in Post 1 under the topics Right View and the Kaccanagotta Sutta.
The Discourse on Causal Relations [The Four Characteristics of Dependent Arising] and the Ten Powers Formula will provide everyone with much of the understanding of Buddhist causality. However, there are a number of other suttas which looks at Buddhist causality from other viewpoints. Here are three examples:
1) The Twelvefold Formula, also known as the Wheel of Becoming, explains the causal process from the standpoint of a human being. This topic is located in Post 1 under the beginning of the Noble Eightfold Path, Right View, settling in the sub-topic The Kaccanagotta Sutta. The Kaccanagotta Sutta is the Buddha's response to Kondanna's remarkable statement on the Buddha's first discourse that the Buddha is saying "whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation (Saccasamyutta Mahavaga SN5. 423)" i.e., everything is impermanent and subject to arising and ceasing. The Twelvefold Formula begins with Ignorance...on to becoming, birth, old age and death itemizing the stages of human life.
2) Dependent arising applies to everything in the world, the physical and the mental. Here, we will look at two of the individual mental things the Madhupindika Sutta brings attention to, perception and conception. The Madhupindika Sutta has just been discussed in this Post 4. The organ of the eye is the first sense organ examined in the Madhupindika. The roles of the remaining sense organs are described in later passages in the Sutta Pitaka. The following "Honeyball" formula is repeated below to aid the reader:
Depending upon the visual sense and the visible object, O brethren,
arises visual consciousness; the coming together of these three is
contact [experience]; depending upn contact arises feeling.
What one feels one perceives; what one perceives one reasons
about. What one reasons about, one is obsessed with.
Due to such obsessions, a person is assailed by obsessed
perceptions and concepts in regard to visible objects cognizable by
the visual sense, belonging to the past, the future and the present.
(Madhupindika MN1. 111, EEB p. 40)
Buddhist causality is formed in the mind via two mental categories, perception and conception. Following contact [experience] feeling arises and what one feels one perceives. Perception occurs because of a person's feeling of that experience. Perception also means the experience is "known". Following perception one reasons [conceives] about that experience. Conceiving of that experience also means that experience can be "spoken" about. The relationship between the two categories could be expressed, from the standpoint of taste sense, as follows:
On a hot day, suppose a school child purchased an ice cream cone. His/her first tasting of it, a sweet and cool taste, is the perception, the experience of the event itself. The ice cream tasted sweet and cool and he/she enjoyed the treat. This is the school child's conception of the event, his/her expression or feeling of it, a positive and pleasurable experience.
This is how sense experience comes about, dependent on a number of steps leading to contact/experience as is indicated in part 1) of the Madhupindika. From contact arises feeling. In the school child's case, the experience resulted in the conception of an enjoyable experience. In the case of the primal perception [experience] of a transcendentalist the following contact and arising feeling gives rise to the conception [causality] of a belief in a soul. For this reason, to evade the egoism arising from a belief in a soul, the Buddha encouraged the removal of the obsession for a belief in a soul arising in perception and conception.
3) Connected to the previous example is this third. From the standpoint of dependent arising, not only are concepts dependently arisen, but, so too are all percepts and for that matter, all mental objects. In fact, sanna [perception] is described as "putting together and knowing" and sankha [conception] means "putting together and speaking" (EEB p.43). This means everything is "put together", is impermanent and subject to alteration. This also means the absolute nor an essence are possible, no more than is a soul, for all phenomena is "put together", i.e. dependently arisen. The conception of a soul cannot be accounted for in all of human experience, for human experience is caused, "put together", whereas the soul is permanent, eternal, absolute and uncaused, therefore, is beyond human experience. To accept the idea of a soul in spite of this information is to continue "...the search for ...[a]...mysterious entity or substance in the explanation of phenomena (HPB p. 57)".
Summation of Absolutism vs. Buddhist
Causality and Relativity
==============================
The primary goal of Buddhism is the removal of human suffering. In the Madhupindika Sutta, the Buddha discovers the cause of human suffering is the belief in a personal soul arising out of feeling. The ensuing perception and reasoning of it results in the obsession with the soul which thereafter colors all experience. This produces an egotistical view of experience characterized by craving and attachment, leading to our "resorting to rods and weapons."
So, what to do about it? First of all, the Buddha was a philosopher and expected his listeners to appreciate he would apply investigation and reflection to his arguments and find his arguments always in favor of the ethical rather than the unethical. Argumentation is a method the Buddha was comfortable with . It is a method, along with reasoning, Indian philosophers relied on for centuries in support of their claims. With this outlook he proceeded to argue "we humans are totally able, provided we apply the necessary effort, to remove the belief in a soul and replace this belief with a belief in an empirical self based on these arguments: 1) causality and 2) relativity".
1) The first is a specific causal argument, the example located immediately above, the final paragraph of the Dependent Arising topic, explaining everything we experience, physical or mental, is "put together". A soul is never "put together", thus it cannot be experienced, a belief in it is just as absurd as a belief in God, an uncaused cause which makes no sense from Buddhism's standpoint of dependent arising. Remove the absurdity of a belief in a soul, the Buddha proposes, by replacing our perception [experience/feeling] of it with a different conception [reasoning] of it. This, of course, is extremely difficult to do, the altering of one's feelings. As difficult as it is to do, for the sake of attaining the good and the peaceful, this process is necessary for "The intellectual life of a human consists of substituting a conceptual order [order being accounted for by the process of dependence] for the perceptual ordering which experience takes place (EEB p. 43)".
Dependent arising allows the Buddhist to remove the belief in an eternal soul and replace it with a belief in an empirical becoming self. The belief in a soul is based upon the emotion/feeling of craving and attachment for a metaphysical self, whereas, the belief in an empirical self is based upon the emotion/feeling grounded in sense experience.
The belief in the soul is a belief which must be removed as it is a belief harboring pure subjectivity leading to obsessions harboring craving and attachment resulting in our "resorting to rods and weapons...quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice...(Madhupindika MN1. 111)". The successful completion of this transaction may seem a daunting task, but, with sufficient effort, mindfulness and concentration, the Buddha felt this is the path to the good and peaceful.
2) The short discussion on the second argument, relativity, exposes how the Fact-Value Distinction is as much a duality as is the famous Ying-Yang Taoist symbol of the "poles of opposites". For the Buddha, dualism is worrisome as it does nothing more than promote mystery.
The Fact-Value Distinction argument was probably originated in the mind of an absolutist since soul believers have always out-numbered the non-believers. If that is the case, all of his/her opinions and views are also likely filled with the subjectivity originating from the "I" or the soul. Consequently one of the Absolutist's major arguments, that the Fact camp is objective and the Value camp is completely subjective, has been rendered almost useless; the Absolutists finding themselves ultimately anchored in subjectivity. Furthermore, the Buddha contends absolute distinction is "metaphysical" (SN2. 77, HBP p. 54) in rebutting the claims of the absolutists.
The point the Buddha is making is that the belief in the absolute, the existent, the permanent, the eternal are not only incorrect views of the world and the self, but, an unethical view of the world/self producing ideas leading to greed, hatred and delusion and lead to "...resorting to rods and weapons...quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice and false speech...(Madhupindika MN1. 110)".
[Before leaving this discussion on Buddhist Relativity, I would like to direct you to an important sutta called The Mirror of Dhamma. The Mirror of Dhama is a sutta which itemizes the Dhamma's qualities of peacefulness in regard to Buddhist Relativity and Speech. This important relationship is located in the Mahaparinibbana DN2 .93 and is discussed in Post 1 under Right Speech.]
THEORY AND PRACTICE
====================
Long before Buddhism splintered off into different directions, there was much controversy over the relative importance of theory and practice in Buddhism (BP p. 168). The controversial question is, is it "learning" or "practice" which is more valuable in Buddhism? This question was settled, as far as the Mahayanists were concerned, when Bodhidharma, an Indian Buddhist monk, brought Zen into China declaring Zen is:
A special tradition outside the Scriptures;
No dependence upon words and letters:
Direct pointing at the soul of man;
Seeing into one's own nature and the attainment of Buddhahood. (BP p. 167)
"A special tradition" is Bodhidharma's reference to Mahayana Zen Buddhism's belief that concepts derived from "words and letters" are unable to denote reality (BP p. 175). By "denoting reality" the zen meant arriving at transcendent ultimate reality via meditation, by "pointing at the soul of man". From the standpoint of original Buddhism, searching for ultimate reality by looking into the soul of man could never be an objective of Buddhism. The more important question is, "did the Buddha believe theory is unimportant and meditation is the primary objective?"
It is true the Buddha did say "mere textual analysis (BP p. 169) " will not allow a person to experience the good...of the dhamma (Magaddupamma-sutta MN1.134), but, he also told his followers to study the dhamma "meaning beside meaning and expression beside expression, without dissension (Pasadika sutta DN3.129)". So, what activity would result in "experiencing the good of the dhamma?" In the Anguttara Nikaya the Buddha uses four kinds of rain clouds as metaphors to describe the activities of four kinds of individuals to answer this question:
The Sutta of the Clouds
=================
1) the one that thunders [studies] but does not rain [practice]
2) the one that rains [practices] but does not thunder [study]
3) the one that neither thunders [studies] nor rains [practices]
4) the one that both thunders [studies] and rains [practices]
(Clouds AN2. 102)
This cloud model only suggests an individual should both study and practice the dhamma for best results. Immediately following this cloud model, the Buddha's preference appears to reveal itself as he describes the cloud that thunders as one who is a "talker" and a cloud that rains one who is a "doer".
It may be the Buddha used the word "talker" derisively as he was critical of those who overspent time on textual learning (BP p. 169). An example is his criticism of the Brahmins as "mere reciters of the Vedic hymns" who neither lived nor practiced its teachings (BP p. 169). The "doers" implies that these are those who did not only study, but, also lived the Buddhist teachings.
An ensuing passage in the same sutta seemingly continues the Buddha's favoring of the "doers" over the "talkers" by distinguishing between those who "master" the dhamma and those who "understand" the dhamma. Those who "master" the dhamma are the clouds that thunders, mastering the "discourses, mixed prose and verse, expositions, verses, inspired utterances, quotations, birth stories, amazing accounts, and questions and answers (AN2. 103)". On the other hand, a cloud that rains "understands" the Four Noble Truths: This is suffering, This is the origin of suffering, This is the cessation of suffering and This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering (AN2. 103). The "doers" understands Buddhist practice is the practicing of the Four Noble Truths.
In the Sutta of the Clouds the Buddha is saying things quite differently from what Bodhidharma is saying in his introduction to zen. It says theory for the Buddha means knowledge of the Dhamma and practice means living of the Dhamma, which includes the practice of meditation.. Bodhidharma rejects scriptural knowledge altogether and by practicing he means seeking ultimate reality via meditation. This is totally a transcendental approach to the theory and practice of Buddhism.
Practice of the Three Phases and Twelve Modes [Final Practice]
=============================================
Bodhidharma transcendentalized Buddhist practice with his "Direct pointing to the soul of man". Although, throughout human history, transcendentalists have seen the divine in people, animals, rocks, plants, rivers, caves, oceans, mountains and in almost anything else imaginable, yet, they would be hard pressed to discover the transcendent in the practice of the Sutta of the Clouds. The "understanding" of the Four Noble Truths of the Sutta of the Clouds is the same practice recommended in the Buddha's final practice. It is a practice so thorough and exhaustive, in spite of the Buddha's theoretical knowledge, he said he would not have attained "unsurpassed perfect enlightenment (SN5. 423) " without having gone through the final practice.
The Buddha's final practice is located in the Dhammacakkapappavattana Sutta (Setting in Motion the Wheel of the Dhamma SN5. 421) the Buddha's first discourse. The Buddha began the sutta with Buddhism's core theory---the Four Noble Truths including the Noble Eighthfold Path and ends the sutta acknowledging Kondonna's great insight into the Four Noble Truths, arising and ceasing and all that it implies: 1) anicca [impermanance], 2) dukkha [suffering] and 3) anatta [non-soul/non-substance]. This first discourse is immediately relevant as its aim is to express the theory and practice of Buddhism.
Having suitably addressed Buddhist theory, the Buddha dove into its final practice. The final practice could be called the "Practice of the Three Phases and Twelve Modes (SN5. 423, n. 382)".
The Three Phases are identified below under (A), (B), (C). The Twelve Modes are simply the Three Phases applied to each of the Four Noble Truths [3 x 4 = 12]:
The Three Phases
=============
(A) the knowledge of each truth [saccanana]
(B) the knowledge of the task to be accomplished regarding each truth [kiccanana]
(C) the knowledge of accomplishment regarding each truth [katanana]
The Twelve Modes
===============
1) this is the noble truth of suffering
2) this noble truth is to be fully understood
3) this noble truth of suffering has been fully understood
1) this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering
2) this noble truth of the origin of suffering is to be abandoned
3) this noble truth of the origin of suffering has been abandoned
1) this is the noble truth of the cessation of suffering
2) this noble truth of the cessation of suffering is to be realized
3) this noble truth of the cessation of suffering has been realized
1) this is the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering
2) this noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering is to be developed
3) this noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering has been developed
The ethical knowledge accumulated by the completion and practice of the Twelve Modes would have enabled the Buddha to attain "unsurpassed perfect enlightenment" giving credence to Bodhidharma's claim that practice trumps theory. The Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta may have convinced Bodhidharma his conclusion is correct. However, surely, the Buddha understood without knowledge of the theory how was one to know what was it to be practiced? It may be this is only the Buddha's way of saying Buddhism is not a theory about life, but, Buddhism is in fact a way of life.
[Footnote: The final practice is also discussed in Post 1 under to topic of Right Mindfulness]
God/gods and Other Divine/Imagined Mental Objects
======================================
Today, we know that there had to be an incredible number of events to occur for life to appear on earth. The Buddha did not know this, but, nevertheless rejected the idea of a creator God, an uncaused cause, as a source of life, human or otherwise. This is because the Buddha was opposed to the supernatural, the metaphysical, the divine, the transcendental, i.e., any knowledge acquired other than through the senses. However, the Buddha was not opposed to the gods or other characters that populated his own heavenly-hellish playbook [?]. We will see the Buddha needed the "other world" as a support for his own philosophical and ethical views. In a first step towards acquiring this support the Buddha had to establish his definition of gods. His discourse on the Four Kinds of Generation gave the Buddha the opportunity to provide this definition:
"Sariputta, there are these four kinds of generation. What are the four? Egg-born generation, womb-born generation, moisture-born generation, and spontaneous generation."
The Buddha continues with his definition of spontaneous generation, from which also proceeds the contents of his "heavenly- hellish playbook" ---"What is spontaneous generation? There are gods and denizens of hell and certain human beings and some beings in the lower worlds; this is called spontaneous generation (Mahasihanada MN1. 73)".
The participants of the Buddha's heavenly-hellish playbook did not include the Creator, All-Powerful, Eternal God found in the texts of the transcendentalists. All gods emanating from the spontaneous generation world were subject to bhava [becoming], were impermanent and therefore were not eternal (BCP p. 49). The Buddha did speak many times to the gods and other heavenly and hellish beings in his heavenly-hellish playbook. How did the Buddha come to this relationship? A western psychologist, Julian Jaynes, offers a possibility: he proposes, until 3,000 years ago, the human mind was bicameral and people commonly heard thoughts from one mind to the other. Consequently, many believed they were hearing sacred words. The Buddha also participated, yakking to the gods, as did many others.
Soon enough the Buddha's spontaneous generation idea was challenged by many others including Prince Payasi who said in the Buddha's Debate with a Sceptic:
"There is no other world, there are no spontaneously born beings, there is no fruit or result of good or evil deeds (Payasi Sutta DN2. 316)."
Yes, these were Payasi's words, but, every idea originated from the materialists, positivists and those scientifically inclined. "There is no fruit or result of good or evil deeds" came straight from the mouth of Ajita Kesamkabali one of the first of India's great materialists (BCP p. 43). "There is no other world" came from the likes of Aristotle from the Fact camp who found incomprehensible the "other world" of ethics, morality and concepts like peacefulness and human suffering. Unlike physical facts which can be verified absolutely value statements were nothing more than "unverifiable opinion" to Aristotle and the materialists. This Fact - Value Distinction has been discussed previously in Post 4.
Sangarava Sutta
============
No, the Buddha stood firmly in the Value camp and could not reject the ethical world by saying "There is no other world". Thereupon, Sangarava [aka Bharadvaja], a Brahmin student asked the Buddha "Are there gods? (BCP p. 47)".
Buddha: On good grounds it is known to me that there are gods.
Sangarava: When questioned, "But now, good Gotama, are there gods?" why do you say, "On good grounds it is known to me that there are gods?" When that is the case, good Gotama, isn't there emptiness and confusion?
Buddha: Bharadvaja, when questioned, "Are there gods?" if one were to say: "There are gods," and someone were to say, "What is known on good grounds is known to me," therein a definite conclusion has to be reached by an intelligent person that there are gods.
Sangarava: Why didn't the good Gotama say so at the beginning?
Buddha: Bharadvaja, there is high level of agreement (ucce sammatam) in the world that there are gods.
(BCP p. 47, MN2. 212).
Not only is Sangarava completely confused, evidenced by his final comment "Why didn't the good Gotama say so at the beginning?" when in fact the Buddha did say so [In addition, the Majjhima Nikaya says the above text is likely "corrupted" which adds confusion for the reader as well (MN2. 213, n. 921)]. The Buddha reduces this confusion when he says "There are gods" not because everyone else says so, but, because this is "a definite conclusion...reached by an intelligent or wise person". An even more clarifying statement is the one he makes to Sangarava, "On good grounds it is known to me that there are gods." "On good grounds" means the Buddha thought long and hard about this question and concluded "there are gods". This is a process not foreign to the Buddha as per his advice to his son Rahula:
"What do you think, Rahula? What is the purpose of a mirror?"
"For the purpose of reflection, venerable sir."
"So too, Rahula, an action with the body should be done after repeated reflection; an action by speech should be done after repeated reflection; an action by mind should be done after repeated reflection...any action done with body, speech or mind should not lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others or the affliction of both (Ambalatthikarahulovada MN1. 415).
This is a process that must be applied to all ethical questions as all actions taken by body, speech or mind has consequences for one's own Kamma. The Buddha concluded "on good grounds" there is "another world" of gods, just as there is "another world" of ethics and morality, unknown to the materialists and Aristotle. These other worlds are not characterized by absolutism, eternalism, nihilism or transcendent-alism, but, by bhava [becoming], impermanence, suffering and anatta [non-self]/non-substantiality.
Brahma Sahamapatti and Brahma Bakka
=============================
The Buddha spoke to the many gods, hellish beings and heavenly beings populating his heavenly-hellish playbook. The most consequential of the gods he yakked with were Brahma Sahamapatti and Brahma Bakka. The Buddha's yakking with the gods Sahamapatti and Bakka were the most consequential as their encounters with the Buddha suggest, due to the positions they held, the Buddha had already fought a war against the transcendentalists [meaning the Buddha is preparing for encounters with the transcendentalists of the future] and was very familiar with the battle lines involved. Battle lines? What Battle lines?! The Buddha was familiar with the battle lines because he had long argued with the major transcendentalists of his time, the Hindus and Jains about their views along these fronts: the 1) ethical front and 2) the philosophical, world view and psychological fronts.
The ethical front is the primary front as Buddhism's ethical/moral views are foundational to Buddhism being Buddhism. The other front [the "components" of Buddhism]---the philosophical, world view and psychological---are there to support Buddhism's ethical/moral views each in its own way.
In regard to philosophy the Buddha was a traditional Indian philosopher who relied upon reason and argumentation as his working tools; he was also a global philosopher, of the world, and therefore applied the tools of investigation and reflection, accepted by philosophers worldwide, to any problem he encountered. His philosophy of Buddhism included examination into becoming [bhava], the middle way and dependent arising. His world view could be said to be grouped in the Three Characteristics of Existence---impermanence, suffering and non-self or non-substantiality---which are discussed in Post 1 under the heading the Kaccanagotta Sutta. All of these categories--- philosophy, world view and also Buddhist psychology [empirical psychology being unique to Buddhism never having existed elsewhere in the world prior to Buddhism's arrival] are there to support Buddhism's central concern, its ethical views. None of these categories are mutually exclusive; every category is connected to every other. For instance the dukkha [suffering] of the Three Characteristics of Existence is directly related to its ethics. Its philosophy of dependent arising is applicable to all of the other categories as well and its psychology of non-self is likewise applicable to every other category.
Returning to the Buddha's conversation with Brahma Sahamapatti, it is a conversation initiated by the Buddha's lament following his enlightenment:
"I considered: 'This Dhamma that I have attained is profound, hard to see and hard to understand, peaceful and sublime, unattainable by mere reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by the wise. But this generation delights in adhesion, takes delight in adhesion, rejoices in adhesion. It is hard for such a generation to see this truth, namely specific conditionality, dependent origination. And it is hard to see this truth, namely, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all attachments, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbana. If I were to teach the Dhamma, others would not understand me, and that would be wearying and troublesome for me'....Considering thus, my mind inclined to inaction rather than to teaching the Dhamma (Ariyapariyesana MN1. 168).
Thereafter, Brahma Sahamapatti responded: 'Venerable sir, let the Blessed One teach the Dhamma. There are beings with little dust in their eyes who are wasting through not hearing the Dhamma. There will be those who will understand the Dhamma (Ariyapariyesana MN1. 168).'
Brahma Sahamapatti was the "good" Brahma as he supported the Buddha's views and encouraged him to teach the Dhamma in spite of the hardships the Buddha would likely face. The points Brahma Sahamapatti most supported on the Buddha's lament was that "...this generation delights in adhesion, takes delight in adhesion, rejoices in adhesion..." and the Buddha's solution to this problem is "...the relinquishing of all attachments...the destruction of craving". In other words this is the ethical front to be fought in the battle, i.e., attachment vs non-attachment.
Brahma Bakka, on the other hand was the "bad" Brahma as he was dead set against the idea of impermanence and instead set forth this pernicious view:
'This is permanent, this is everlasting, this is eternal, this is total, this is not subject to pass away; for this neither is born nor ages nor dies nor passes away nor reappears, and beyond this there is no escape (Brahmanimantanika MN1. 326).
With these words, Brahma Bakka establishes the second front is the philosophical or world view front, i.e., permanence vs impermanence. It is clear Brahma Bakka was aware impermanence is foundational to Buddhist philosophy, world view and psychology and challenged it with the common belief in permanence.
In the ensuing permanence vs impermanence argument, Brahma Bakka was assisted by Mara, the Evil One [aka The Temptor]. First, the Buddha belittled Bakka by saying Bakka "...has lapsed into ignorance (MN1. 326)" and of Mara he said, "I know you, Evil One...you do not know me (MN1. 327)". In spite of Mara's reach, sway, power, might and influence, the Buddha added "...because I have direct knowledge...I know more than you (MN1. 329)".
The Buddha surpassed both Brahma Bakka and Mara in knowledge as he not only had "direct knowledge---experiential knowledge realized directly by the mind (chatgpt),---but, also the knowledge of probabilities [anvayenana/inductive reasoning]. This knowledge allowed the Buddha to say "...this generation delights in adhesion, takes delight in adhesion, rejoices in adhesion (MN1. 168)" and to confidently expect all transcendental religions in the future would adhere to the same attachment based ethic existing in the Buddha's time and would oppose the idea of impermanence with the same fervor as did Brahma Bakka.
Today, as it turns out, all the major religions of the world, Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Jainism and Mahayana Buddhism are transcendental and characterized by the same attachment based ethic and opposition to impermanence experienced by the Buddha. The major transcendental teachings in the Buddha's time in India were Hinduism and Jainism. The Buddha's arguments were directed against these entities, especially towards Hinduism the more popular of the two. The Buddha's knowledge based on direct knowledge and the knowledge of probabilities has proved superior to that of Brahma Bakka's and Mara's. The Buddha understood his argument against transcendentalism in the future would remain the same as in his own time. Thus, the lines of battle were drawn, even in regard to wars in the future, which reaches its most probable conclusion in the following Brahmajala Sutta.
Brahmajala Sutta
=============
The Brahmajala Sutta opens with Suppiya a wanderer engaged with his pupil Brahmadatta, with Suppiya disparaging the Buddha, Dhamma and the Sangha and Brahmadatta in turn praising them. The Brahmajala ends with Ananda [the Buddha's cousin and most devoted follower] saying "...it is wonderful. What is the name of this exposition of Dhamma?" The Buddha says it is the Incomparable Victory in Battle, an indication of who the victor is in the Suppiya - Brahmadatta debate and who the victors are in the Incomparable Victory in Battle.
Dr. Kalupahana in his Ethics in Early Buddhism summarizes The Brahmajalla Sutta as "present(ing) the most comprehensive description of virtues [silas] in the early discourses...it consists of two parts: 1) the contents of the virtues and 2) the sixty two forms of metaphysical views...with no philosophical unity between the two...However, taken as a whole the two parts provide an extremely sophisticated thesis on morals (EEB p. 70).
Dr. Kalupahana proceeds to advance Brahmajalla's thesis on morals skillfully in his book [as he does on any Buddhist topic he is commenting on], but, here, I would like to continue to advance my own narrative, based on the Buddha's "heavenly-hellish playbook" from which the Buddha came to know there are "other worlds". My narrative will rely upon the ideas drawn from the two parts of the Brahmajala Sutta, 1) the contents of the virtues and 2) the sixty two forms of metaphysical views.
As previously discussed, the battles the Buddha is referring to are Buddhism's coming future battles with the Transcendentalists. The battles are to be fought on two fronts, the 1) ethical and 2) the differing world, philosophical and psychological views just as it was fought in the Buddha's past battles with the Hindus and Jains.
The Virtues
=========
On the ethical front, the attachment based ethic of the Transcendentalists is pitted against Buddhism's non-attachment/detachment based ethic.
However, on the Ethical Front, the Brahmajala Sutta is not very helpful as it presents only "the most comprehensive description of virtues". The virtues [silas] may be foundational to Buddhist ethics, but, it is only the lowest level of Buddhist morality. What the Buddhist Ethical Front requires is the support of the other two levels of Buddhist morality, the middle level, which is the Noble Eightfold Path and its highest level, as is recorded in the Simile of the Raft (MN1. 135) stating the objective of Buddhism is the relinquishing of all attachments. One must look to other sources other than the Brahmajala for ethical data since the Brahmajala is unable to provide any ethical data with the exception of the virtues. A source which can be considered is the just previously discussed Buddha's lament following his enlightenment (MN1. 168) in association with his conversation with Brahma Sahamapatti.
In the Buddha's lament, he describes the Noble Eighthfold Path [the middle ethical level] as "peaceful and sublime" which is about as much as one would desire in a description of good human behavior [the Noble Eightfold Path is discussed in Post 1]. The attachment problem is posed in the Simile of the Raft [the highest ethical level] with "this generation delights in adhesion, takes delight in adhesion, rejoices in adhesion" the solution to which is "the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all attachments, the destruction of craving". The problem is attachment and Buddhism's solution, non-attachment are stated here, meaning the primary ethical problem facing Buddhism is to answer the question posed in the 2nd Noble Truth: because craving and its attendant attachment are the causes of all human suffering, what is the evidence craving and attachment are unethical states of mind?
Although the sixty two forms of metaphysical views or The Sixty Two Kinds of Wrong Views consumes most of the Brahmajala Sutta, the Buddha began his discourse with Buddhist ethics and morality. The reason is the Buddha's philosophy, world view and psychology are there only to completely support its ethics and morality, and the Buddha needed his followers to understand this even if the example of Buddhist morality given is merely Buddhism's lowest morality, the virtues. The introductory discourse is of three parts: 1) the short section on morality which is followed by 2) the middle section on morality and ends with 3) the large section on morality. The short section on morality begins with the virtues or Silas, the foundational first steps of Buddhist ethics and morality. This section represents the teaching of the dhamma and is practiced by all Buddhists:
1) Abandoning the taking of life
2) Abandoning the taking of what is not given
3) Abandoning unchastity
4) Abandoning false speech
5) Abandoning malicious speech
6) Abandoning harsh speech
7) Abandoning idle chatter
(DN1. 4)
The short section also includes other behaviors the Buddha avoids such as deception and insincerity...buying and selling. In this way the worldling praises the Tathagatha (DN1. 5).
The middle and large sections are mostly concerned with the behaviors and conduct of the Buddha and the Sangha as they are the moral "role models" for all Buddhists. The middle section, interestingly, begins with a moral practice relevent to the modern world, the protection of the environment (DN1. 6). The behavior of the Buddha and Sangha should also include the refraining from idle pursuits such as participating in various popular games and avoiding self adornment. Other things to avoid are engaging in idle conversation and being involved in disputation.
The last section, the large section on morality, says much about the livelihood of the Buddha and the Sangha, i.e. not to make their living by practicing base arts such as palmistry, prediction, making sacrifices or practicing medicine of the eye, ear, nose or surgery of one kind or another. However, the Buddha ends the three sections by warning these sections are all "elementary, inferior matters of moral practice". Instead, the Buddha proposes there is a more "profound" sutta on ethical matters which is labeled The Sixty-Two kinds of Wrong Views within which are found what does not represent the second front, Buddhist world view, philosophy and psychology:
There are, monks, other matters, profound, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond mere thought, subtle, to be experienced by the wise, which the Tathagata, having realized them by his own super-knowledge, proclaims, and about which those who would truthfully praise the Tathagata would rightly speak. And what are these matters? (DN1. 13).
The 2nd front to consider is the differing world, philosophical and psychological front as represented in The Sixty-Two Kinds of Wrong Views. The entire title of the Brahmajala Sutta "The Supreme Net What the Teaching is Not" is called the Supreme Net because the Sixty-Two Kinds of Wrong Views encompasses all speculative and transcendental views rejected by Buddhism. By stating what the teaching is not, The Sixty-Two Kinds of Wrong Views also states at the same time what Buddhism is all about which makes it "profound, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond mere thought".
The Sixty-Two Kinds of Wrong Views
============================
The Sixty-Two kinds of Wrong Views, in a three part recitation, proceeds to state what does not matter in Buddhist world view, philosophy and psychology. Almost immediately in the first recitation, a speculative theory is proposed ---the self and the world are eternal (DN1. 14)---which says impermanence is not the fact of the world or the self. Thus the frontline of Buddhist philosophy, world view and psychology which are anchored by the conception of impermanence, is challenged by the ascetics and Brahmins who are eternalists, giving their reasons for a belief in permanence and eternalism of which there are many. But, what the Buddha says is the self and the world are not eternal but are impermanent.
In the second recitation, in a fanciful tale of beings reborn in the Abhassara Brahma world, there arises a being in the empty Brahma palace, who, being the first to arise there thinks: "I am Brahma, the Conqueror, the Unconquered, the All-seeing, the All-Powerful, the Lord, the Maker and Creator, Ruler, Appointer and Orderer, Father of All That Have Been and Shall Be (DN1. 18)." The establishment of the permanent Creator God by the transcendentalists is definitely another challenge to Buddhism's conception of impermanence. But, the Buddha says is there simply is no such thing as a Creator God. Yes, the Buddha did admit to the existence of impermanent gods in his heavenly-hellish playbook but rejected completely the existence of an eternal Creator God.
This Creator God is supported not only by the Eternalists, but, also a category whose occupants are "partly Eternalists and partly Non-Eternalists (DN1. 19) [this category represents the views of the Hindus who had to admit to the experience of impermanence around them, obvious enough as they saw living things arise and cease and all matter being subject to erosion. Otherwise they were totally eternalists]". A couple of devas [heavenly beings] are also of this category: 1) devas Corrupted by Pleasure, 2) devas Corrupted by Mind. Also included in this category is an ascetic or Brahmin who is a logician or reasoner, who say they are selves with "what is called thought, or mind or consciousness, that is a self that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change for ever and ever (DN1. 21)". Hereafter, in the Brahmajalla, the Creator God is no longer an issue nor is an eternal self as Buddhism's argument is that there simply are no such things, but, the partly Eternalists and Partly Non-Eternalists do not agree.
Thus far, in the first two recitations, these are the major wrong views which have been established by the ascetics, Brahmans, eternalists, logicians and reasoners: 1) the self and world are eternal (DN1. 14),
2) there is a permanent Creator God (DN1. 18), 3) there are permanent selves [souls] (DN1. 21). Of course, Buddhism rejects every one of these views for every one supports permanence. Dr. Kalupahana in his summation of the Brahmajala Sutta says it consists of two parts: 1) the contents of the virtues and 2) the Sixty Two Forms of Metaphysical Views...with no philosophical unity between them. However, within the contexts of my narrative of the two fronts---the ethical and the philosophical+world +psychological views---Buddhism's philosophy, world and psychological views has everything to do with Buddhist ethics for the "components" of Buddhism are there only as a support for Buddhist morality. An example is, Buddhist ethics would not exist if permanence ruled the world, for if that were the case all decisions and actions would be permanent and no one would have the opportunity to improve their kamma. Nevertheless, the transcendentalists are determined to prove the Buddhists wrong and in the second recitation raises the Deductive vs Inductive Reasoning argument; an argument the Buddha was well prepared for and sees the weaknesses of the arguments of the transcendentalists.
Deductive vs Inductive Reasoning
=========================
The Deductive vs Inductive Reasoning argument is an epic argument [as expressed between the Fact and Value camps previously in Post 4], epic because it explains how those who supported permanence and those who supported impermanence in the 2nd front arrived at their conclusions. The Digha Nikaya's definition of deductive reasoning is as follows:
This, monks, the Tathagata understands: These viewpoints thus grasped and adhered to will lead to such-and-such destinations in another world. This the Tathagata knows, and more, but he is not attached to that knowledge.
And being thus unattached he has experienced for himself perfect peace [the ethical], and having truly understood the arising and passing away of feelings, their attraction and peril and the deliverance from them, the Tathagatha is liberated without remainder (DN1. 22).
It is true deductive reasoning will lead to destinations in "another world". Most famously the "natural laws" discovered in physics, chemistry, biology, genetics, mathematics are these "destinations". However, the Buddha says he is not attached to that knowledge. He repeats himself in his summary on deductive reasoning, as it does not lead him to "perfect peace" [the ethical]. Deductive reasoning although seemingly absolute and certain describes only a slice of the cosmos without any ethical or moral content. Nor is there any evidence the cosmos is permanent for when the cosmos changes so will "natural laws" change. On the other hand it is inductive reasoning that will lead to "perfect peace" for it is not deductive reasoning but inductive reasoning that will lead to the ethical:
These monks are those other matters, profound, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond mere thought, subtle, to be experienced by the wise, which the Tathgatha, having realized them by his own super-knowledge, proclaims, and about which those who would truthfully praise the Tathagatha would rightly speak (DN1. 22).
The matters the speculators and transcendentalists are concerned with are shallow, easy to see and understand, unpeaceful [unethical] and attached to cravings and feelings. Inductive reasoning, the reasoning of probabilities [anvayenana], although profound, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful is the reasoning leading to the ethical and the moral. The Buddha "rejected a priori, or deductive, reasoning [takka] as being of little use in discovering truth...(EEB p. 33) [specifically of ethical truths...my addition KT].
Other miscellaneous wrong view arguments in the second recitation are the discussions on the Finitist vs. Infinitist argument---amounting to a discussion similar and akin to the Taoist mystery, the Ying-Yang poles of opposites---; the Eel Wriggler problem [the philosopher that he was, the Buddha expected his opponents to hold certain positions, something the agnostics and skeptics never did]; the Chance-Originists [things happen by chance] who proclaim the chance origin of the self and the world.
The third recitation has questions primarily concerned about the self/soul as the speculators and transcendentalists are obsessed with this very subject. Buddhism, of course, says there is no such thing. The third recitation also has miscellaneous wrong view arguments---"some ascetics and Brahmins [annhilationists and eternalists] claim a doctrine of Unconscious-Post-Mortem-Survival" or "Neither-Conscious-Nor Uncconscious-Post-Mortem-Survival" inquiring into the states of self after death. Another follows the argument of the Annhilationists who proclaims "the annhilation, destruction and non-existence of beings" after death (DN1, 17-34).
Even more third recitation miscellaneous wrong view arguments are as follows---the asetics and Brahmins also claim they are able to access "spheres" [of Infinite Space, Infinite Consciousness, of No-Thingness, Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception] to justify states of the self after death. Finally, they employed all the Jhana [meditation techniques] used by the Buddha himself although the Buddha never used Jhana to justify a belief in a self/soul in death or in life.
The Sixty-Two Kinds of Wrong Views represents the contents of most of the Brahmajalla Sutta and answers a number of questions posed by the sutta. First, it supports Brahmadatta's [Suppiya the wanderer's pupil] praising of the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha and refutes Suppiya's "finding fault [with them] in all sorts of ways (DN1. 1)".
Next, it declares the victors in both fronts of the battle---the 1) ethical and the 2) philosophical, world and psychological views---are not the transcendentalists but the Buddhists. In both instances Buddhism is clearly the victor. How can the attachment ethic of the transcendentalists even be considered an ethical option? But, that is what it has been for centuries, the people's choice. Attachment is merely a question of preference, of one's likes and dislikes [rucci-arucci], related directly to one's prejudices. From the Buddha's perspective attachment and craving will only bring the individual and society to become mired in greed, hatred and delusion. That is, it will lead the individual and society to suffering. The Buddha was confident the ethic of non-attachment and detachment will prevent such an outcome.
Likewise my narrative also sees the Brahmajala as the "Incomparable Victory in War (EEB p. 70)" against all of transcendentalism by achieving the objective of providing the evidence that craving and attachment are unethical and immoral at its core. The Victory represents not only the Buddha's historical record in opposition to Hinduism and Jainism, but, what he expects the result will be in any future wars against the transcendentalists. Most importantly, it substantiates the claim of the Second Noble Truth that craving, along with ignorance and attachment, are the causes of all human suffering.
In Post 1 under the topic Right Concentration I have included a similar argument I would like to repeat here:
In its entirety the Buddha has concluded, attachment based ethics will not lead to the good and the peaceful [the ethical]. Ethics based on non-attachment and detachment will. The reason is, when one's attachment to things is dependent on one's approval of that thing in some way or another and when that approval for that thing has been reduced, so will one's compassion for it be reduced. Your compassion for that thing is completely dependent upon your attachment to it. Given it is not easy to alter one's attachments, an effort should be made in this direction for it is in the interest of humankind's [and those of all living things] that attachment ethics does not prevail. When attachment is lost, it is not a problem, but, when compassion is reduced it is not good for the world.
It may very well be those who support attachment based ethics will find refuge in David Hume's observation that "Reason is a slave of the passions [also observed in the Madhupindika Sutta]" and Arthur Schopenhauer's declaration that "We are the puppets of biology [also implied in the 2nd Noble Truth - Craving is the cause of all human suffering]" and find solace in our being the victims of nature. However, for the Buddha, not making an effort to remove harmful attachments is in itself an unethical way of life. There is nothing more unethical than to constantly give in to craving; but, the Buddha has a solution---the ethical life he proposes is none other than the Noble Eightfold Path.
The core of Buddhism's argument is that attachment based ethics is not an ethic at all, but, in fact is a completely unethical position to take. Attachment is merely a person's preferences, i.e., a person's likes and dislikes [rucci-arucci], a selectivity rooted in one's prejudices which can be found embedded in the feelings leading to a belief in a "soul" or an "I". Non-attachment and detachment, on the other hand, are completely ethical goals seeking to remove the craving and attachment bringing suffering to our lives. Since craving connotes addiction or something we are not in control of, it is easily seen as unethical. While attachment connotes approval, it is nevertheless as unethical as craving is; i.e., it seeks to fulfill the urges of the ego [the "I"].
For many centuries, prior to Buddhism's appearance in India, the prevailing world view was the extremes of Hindu eternalism [permanence] and the annhilationism [nihilism] of the materialists. The Buddha argued that neither of these extremes explained how things happen. Rather, the Buddha said impermanence explained the riddle of existence, which he dubbed "the middle way". The process involved what he called "becoming" which had nothing to do with "being" or "extinction".
Impermanence is the first of the Buddhist world views, correctly so, as impermanence provides a foundation for all of Buddhism's physical, psychological [mental] and ethical claims. It is also the first of the Three Characteristics of Existence [the others are Dukkha-Suffering and Anatta-Without/Empty of a Soul/Substance including those of a Creator God]. The Three Characteristics are among Buddhism's major grouping of ideas, preceded only by the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path.
The transcendentalists and materialists, of course, disagreed and profusely gave their reasons for their disagreements in the Sixty-Two Kinds of Wrong Views. The reasoning of Buddhism in turn refuted the reasoning of the transcendentalists/speculators often quite easily. For instance, the Chance-Originists who proclaimed the self and the world have arisen by chance (DN1. 29) had no chance when faced with Buddhism's well designed arguments on Causality or Paticcasamupadda/Dependent Arising. Paticcasamupadda laid to rest such notions as chance origination and even that of free will.
In the Brahmajala Sutta the Buddha gave the battle [exposition of dhamma] several titles: Net of Advantage, Net of Dhamma, the Supreme Net, the Net of Views. However, his favored title is the Incomparable Victory in Battle (DN1. 46). Having fought this war before with the Hindus and Jains he was confident Buddhism would prevail in both fronts, the ethical and philosophical/psychological/world views, in future wars with the transcendentalists and the speculators. He felt Buddhism would attain the same Incomparable Victory in Battle as it had done in the past.
The Buddhist World View
===================
Original, early, primitive or empirical Buddhism is not a religion. It lacks all the beliefs found in religion---a creator God or some kind of an ultimate reality, a belief in an absolute eternal soul and divine laws maintaining a God-soul relationship. Later transcendental Mahayana Buddhism is a religion. It is not too far fetched to say all religions are transcendental, relying on knowledge acquired other than through the senses.
If early Buddhism is not a religion, what is it? It is a world and philosophical view, an ethical view of the world discovered by the Buddha through his senses. The Buddha's world view is unique, Buddhism alone sees everything in the world, mental or physical, as impermanent. Heraclitus and Parmenides, both Greek philosophers, did come to think of impermanence, but, neither accepted impermanence wholly. Impermanence was real provided it rested on a base of permanence. This is similar to the views of the Hindus. Buddhism's world view is that everything is totally impermanent; it is completed in the Three Characteristics of Existence (Dhamma Niyama AN1. 286) when dukkha [suffering] and anatta [none-self/non-substantiality] are added to impermanence [anicca].
Of course, a world view could be derived from any source---religion, art, science, schools of philsophy, etc. The Buddha's world view is not a national or a cultural view, it is an ethical view of the world and it is a world view distinctly his own. His world view says whatever one's situation in life is, whatever one's accomplishments or possessions are, it matters that one has a foundational world view for the living of his/her life.
Theravada-Mahayana History or The Buddha's
Transformation Into A Cosmic Principle (BP p. 113)
==========================================
Buddhist history is dominated by the influence of two ways of thinking: Theravada empiricism and Mahayana transcendentalism. Theravada Buddhism relies on the words of Siddhatha Gotama the Buddha. Mahayana Buddhism is based on the words of its philosophers. Their words are in turn valid if confirmed by the words of the Buddha. The many schools of Buddhist philosophies and religious sects emerged from two founding schools, Sthaviravadins [original] and Mahasanghikas [later]:
Sthaviravadins
===========
a) Theravada [teaching of the elders]
b) Sarvastivada
c) Sautrantika---->Yogacara
d) Hinayana [lesser vehicle]
Mahasanghikas [great assembly]
========================
a) Mahayana [great vehicle]
b) Vajrayana
Sthaviravadins
===========
Prior to his passing, the Buddha gave Ananda, his cousin and most ardent follower, the following instructions in the Digha Nikaya:
And the Lord said to Ananda: 'Ananda, it may be that you will think: "The teacher's instruction has ceased, now we have no teacher!" It should not be seen like this, Ananda, for what I have taught and explained by you as Dhamma and discipline will, at my passing, be your teacher (DN2. 154, BP p. 93).'
The Buddha preferred not to assign a successor after his passing, but, left the responsibility of preserving Buddhist thought to the Sangha [community of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis/monks and nuns]. After the Buddha's death, three Councils were convened, the first at Rajagriha, the second at Vaishali, the third at Pataliputra. The first council, held three months after the Buddha's death, began a period of Buddhist scholasticism where monks recalled and collected the words spoken by the Buddha in order to preserve his teachings (BP p. 94).
In spite of the Buddha's favoring the study of monks should begin with the Dhamma/Sutta Pitaka [teachings] and Vinaya [discipline], the schools belonging to the Sthaviravadins---Theravada/Hinayana,
Sarvastivada and Sautrantika---chose to engage themselves with the preserving of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, the third of the canonical texts "dealing mostly with philosophical analysis and synthesis (BP p. 95)" of the Sutta Pitaka. The two versions of this text are the Theravadin Abhidhamma in the Pali language and the Sarvastivadan Vibhasas in the Sanskrit language. These "two groups of texts...represent the scholastic tradition in Buddhist thought (BP p. 95)."
The Abhidhamma consists of seven parts:
1) Dhammasangani - enumeration of the dhammas or factors of existence
2) Vibhanga - categorizing of the dhammas
3) Dhathukatha - discussion of elements
4) Puggalapannatti - description of an individual
5) Kathavatthu - authored by Moggaliputta Tissa
6) Yamaka - logical treatises on psychological subjects
7) Patthana - the "Book of Relations" or causation
(An Analysis of the Pali Canon - Buddhist Publication Society p. 42)
Early Buddhist Philosophers
=====================
Mogalliputtatissa
=============
With the exception of the Kathavathu, all of the other parts of the Abhidhamma was spoken by the Buddha. The Kathavathu was authored by Mogalliputtatissa, a Brahmin who converted to Buddhism (HBP p. 132) and turned out to be the first of the great Buddhist philosophers. The Kathavathu is included among the Abhidhamma entries as it is a work faithful to early Buddhist ideas. Mogallliputta-
tissa's conversion was an authentic conversion as he supported the middle way in opposition to the Brahmanical extreme of absolute existence and the non-existence of the materialists (HBP p. 121). The Kathavathu also opposes the Brahmanical transcendental description of the Buddha as permanent and eternal (HBP p. 123).
We know today, absolutist and transcendentalist views are not confined to those from a Brahmanical background, but, are valued by many others throughout the world as well. While all parts of the Tipitaka was recorded by monks' verbatim words of the Buddha, the Kathavathu alone is an interpretive work (HBP p. 144). This may have prompted the Sthaviravadin schools---Theravada/Hinayana, Sarvastivadin and Sautrantika---to jump into the interpretive arguments initiated by the Kathavathu. In this wrangle the Kathavathu refutes absolutism and transcendentalism by arguing against the human models proposed by the Personalists, Realists and Transcendentalists:
Personalists
=========
There were no shortage of absolutists or their cousins the spiritualists who were in opposition of the Buddha's description of a person as the Five Aggregates [khandas] absent of a soul. The Kathavathu opens with a question, "Is there a person as an absolute truth, as an ultimate reality? (HBP p. 126)." This is a description of a person posed by the Personalist.
No, the Buddha says, there is no such thing. What he does add is:
It is not mine. He is not me. He is not myself. (SN3. 19, HBP p. 69)
The 1st statement says: the Five Aggregates does not belong to a soul.
The 2nd statement says: the soul [the metaphysical self] is not me.
The 3rd statement says: the empirical self is what I am.
All of this affirms the Buddha's claim in the 3rd of the Three Characteristics of Existence that existence is of Anatta --- non-soul/non-substance/non-substantiality (The Book of the Threes AN1. 286).
The Sthaviravadin schools, employing Buddhaghosa's [a later Theravadin philosopher's] "theory of moments", countered they were in fact able to perceive "...a person as an absolute truth, as an ultimate reality."
The Sarvastivadans claimed the Five Aggregates had four moments of existence: 1) nascent, 2) static, 3) decaying and 4) cessant (HBP p. 126).
The Theravadins claimed the Five Aggregates had three moments of existence: 1) nascent, 2) static, 3) cessant.
Both schools, because one of their moments included a static moment, claimed they were capable of direct perception.
The Sautrantikas accepted only two moments: 1) nascent and 2) cessant. Consequently. because of lacking a static moment they claimed they could perceive "...the person in absolute truth and ultimate reality indirectly or by representational perception."
The "theory of moments" was Buddhaghosa's attempt to somehow explain the impermanence of all phenomena although the Buddha makes no mention of a "theory of moments" in his discourses.
Realists
======
The next argument the Kathavathu confronts is the claim of the Realists, "...the real existence of 'everything [sabbam] at all times [sabbada]' ". At all times? This means the knowledge of the past, present and the future. Sounds like a complicated argument. A simpler solution comes from the Aitareya Upanisad (SIP p. 63): "nothing comes out of nothing (HBP p. 128)" which effectively means the real existence of everything.
The absolutists and spiritualists of the Sthaviravadin school soon came to realize they were sitting on a gold mine of Hindu absolutism located in the Upanisads. Dharmatrata, the most well known of the Sarvarstivadan philosophers took the position the difference between the past, present and the future is the difference in bhava [becoming] where he likened bhava to the altered shapes and forms of gold. Gold's different forms and shapes are an alteration of gold, however, gold itself does not change. For Dharmatrata the changing shapes and forms of gold are an "appearance (HBP p. 128)" and the gold itself is "svabhava or substance (HBP p. 128)". However, for Buddhism, bhava is not an "appearance" nor does there exist svabhava or substance. Bhava for the Buddha meant becoming or impermanence. In making his claims, Dharmatrata, introduced an idea completely foreign to Buddhism, the idea of gold as svabhava or substance. These are exactly the claims of the Maitri Upanisad in The Indescribable Self (SIP p. 95), that reality is composed of the changing empirical and the absolute unchanging ultimate.
The Kathavathu argued against "...real existence of everything...at all times" with many arguments relating to time, the past, present and the future. These arguments are difficult arguments comprehensible fully only by capable scholars, logicians and philosophers. The Kathavathu made its arguments with great effort as evidence of "...the real existence of everything...at all times" would contribute to a belief in the existence of svabhava. This is an outcome the Kathavathu had no wish to be a part of considering it agreed with the empirical view of the Buddha, that everything changes, nothing is permanent.
"Bhikkhus, material form is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, formations are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent. Bhikkhus, material form is not self, feeling is not self, perception is not self, formations are not self, consciousness is not self. All formations are impermanent; all things are not self. (Culasaccaka Sutta MN1. 228)."
There is nothing more that brings suffering to the world than does a belief in a soul or substance. This belief is rooted in craving and attachment for a personal soul or ultimate substance which leads to individual suffering. Collectively, it leads to suffering for whole societies. The Madhupindika Sutta warns that these are the causes of our "...resorting to rods and weapons...quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice and false speech...(MN1. 110)". When these beliefs have become too widespread in Buddhism, Buddhist philosophers have been compelled to take steps to prevent the spread of this pernicious ethical epidemic:
"When the Kathavatthu controverted [argued against/disputed] the view that 'everything exists,' it was not refuting an imaginary or harmless conception but one that was to grow cancerous, hence requiring the services of some of the best analytical minds---those of a linguistic philosopher [Nagarjuna], a psychologist [Vasubandhu], and a logician [Dignaga] (HBP p. 129)."
Transcendentalists
==============
To say a thing, event or phenomenon is transcendental is to say it exists outside of the world of cause and effect or space and time. The Sarvastivadans said this of the Budddha. This description did not originate with the Mahasanghikas. It is important to mention this so as not to give the impression the Mahasanghikas and its schools were solely responsible for the advent of absolutism and transcendentalism in Buddhism.
Although the Buddha said many times Buddhism is not a faith or belief, there were many among the Sthaviravadins who were inclined toward devotion, faith and transcendentalism. As evidence of this claim, the Lalitavistara is "a text that [is among the first which] openly espoused the transcendence of the Buddha" and in fact is a Sarvastivadan work (HBP p. 130). To further transcendentalize the Buddha, the Sarvastivadans also attempted to tag the Buddha with the label of "omniscience", a definition of a person with complete knowledge of the past, present, future (HBP p. 130). However, the Buddha never claimed omniscience and there simply was not any evidence to make that label stick.
The transcendentalists correctly reasoned the greatest competitor to a transcendent public image of the Buddha is a historical record of an empirical Buddha. Ingeniously or insidiously, dependent on one's point of view, the Sarvastivadans decided to prevent people's "the taking of refuge" in the Three Gems: the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha.
The Three Gems
============
The Three Gems---the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha---are three separate conceptions informing people in Buddhist societies what Buddhism is all about. "The taking of refuge" in the Three Gems does not mean the seeking or protection from the hazards of existence, but, "depending on one's own moral behavior to ward off calamities (HBP p. 118)." The Buddha's sutta on the Three Gems are found in the Digha Nikaya (DN3. 5) as follows. The commentary on each gem also follows:
The Buddha
=========
1) This blessed Lord is an 2) Arahant, 3) a fully-enlightened Buddha, 4) endowed with wisdom and conduct, 5) the Well-Farer, 6) Knower of the worlds, 7) incomparable Trainer of men to be tamed, 8) Teacher of gods and humans, 9) the Buddha, the blessed Lord (DN3. 5, HBP p. 111).
The bookends of the nine characteristics of the Buddha is the appellation "Blessed Lord". Bhavaga [the fortunate one] and Tathagatha [the one who has "thus gone"] are the more familiar Sanskrit and Pali descriptions of the Buddha; "Blessed Lord" is clearly the description of Christian/Western translators of the Tipitaka, a description originating from the Lord-Serf relationship and later evolving into the heinous Master-Slave relationship of western culture. The idea of "over lordship" was always rejected by the Buddha (HBP p. 111); the description of the Buddha as "Blessed Lord" is definitely out of place here.
The next appellation directed at the Buddha is of the Buddha in his Arahant period, while he was striving to attain Buddhahood. During this period, he spent time learning from two Brahmin teachers, Alara Kalama and Udakka Ramaputta. He also endured a life style far from his previous life as a householder, in the company of the five ascetics: Assaji, Bhaddiya, Mahanama, Kondanna and Vappa.
After six years of an Arhat [Arahant] existence, Siddhatha became a fully-enlightened Buddha. He was fully-enlightened as he had completed the thorough and rigorous final practice following his enlightenment.
The remaining characteristics are the extra-ordinary attributes of the Buddha. Previously Siddhatha was an Arhat, now he is awakened, a Buddha. The first attribute is that he is now endowed with wisdom and conduct. Now he is awake and has thus attained greater wisdom and in Buddhism this inevitably leads to superior conduct. Next, he is the Well-Farer. He is neither omniscient nor divine; being a human, he is both physically and psychologically healthy. He is also a Knower of the worlds, knowing his world is impermanent and dependently arisen; thereafter he extrapolates other worlds must likewise be so.
The final two attributes are connected to each other by the Buddha's knowledge of elephant training: he knows before an elephant can be trained [taught] it must be tamed. In this sense he is an incomparable Trainer of men to be tamed and Teacher of gods and humans. Not even the gods stand above the Buddha in all respects including possessing greater knowledge. These are the attributes of the Bhavaga, the Tathagatha, the fully-enlightened Buddha.
The Dhamma
==========
Well-proclaimed by the Blessed Lord is the Dhamma, visible here and now, timeless, inviting inspection, leading onward, to be realised by the wise, each one for himself [Three Gems (DN3. 5)].
These are also the exact descriptions of the Mirror of Dhamma Sutta (DN2. 93). The Mirror of Dhamma is a sutta which itemizes the qualities of peacefulness while resting on the foundation of Buddhist relativity. This relationship is discussed in Post 1 under the topic Right Speech and in Post 4 under the topic Buddhist Relativity.
The Sangha
=========
Well-trained is the order of the Lord's disciples, trained in uprightness, methodically trained, excellently trained is the order of the Lord's disciples, that is, the four pairs of men, the eight classes of individuals. This is the order of the Lord's disciples, worthy of respect, worthy of homage, worthy of gifts, worthy of salutation, an unsurpassed field in the world for merit (Three Gems DN3. 5).
It is very important the rules of the Vinaya Pitaka [Rules of the Order] are observed assiduously by the bhikkhus [monks] and bhikkhunis [nuns] of the sangha as the public will judge the Sangha by the behavior of its members. The public's image of the sangha should be that its members are well trained and consequently are well behaved. Thus, they will be worthy of respect, worthy of homage, worthy of salutation.
Not only will sangha members better themselves by observing the Vinaya rules, but, they will also be "worthy of gifts". This says the sangha is completely dependent on the public for food and income. Early on, the administrators of the sangha understood this full well. In fact, after the Buddha's death, the holding of the third council at Petaliputra was necessitated by the many violations of Vinaya rules by its members (HBP p. 132).
Before leaving this discussion on the Sthaviravadin school and proceeding on to the Mahasanghika school three authors and a Theravadin philosopher named Buddhaghosa should be noted: Caroline Rhys Davis and Shwe Zan Aung are the authors of "The Points of Controversy" (HBP p. 133) and Nyanatiloka Mahathera is the author of "Guide Through the Abhidhamma Pitaka" (HBP p. 133). Both texts have guided many students through the difficult terrain of the Abhidhamma.
Buddhaghosa
==========
The appearance of the Theravadin philosopher Buddhaghosa, 250 years after the Buddha's death, marks a turning point in the history of Buddhism. Previously, the views of empirical Buddhism as supported in Moggaliputtatissa's Kathavathu, represented the views of the Sutta Pitaka. However, when Buddhaghosa created his Vissudhi Magga [the Path of Purification], an entirely new interpretation of Buddhism emerged.
Buddhaghosa is reputed to have been from a Brahmin background and was a Buddhist monk who lived in south India, but, was born in Bodhgaya, where the Buddha attained enlightenment. He was consequently given the name "voice of the Buddha" by his sangha (HBP p, 206, 207). Buddhaghosa is revered in the south eastern asian Theravada countries (HBP p. 206). Why? The reason is his ideas approached a transcendent vision of Buddhism. This is a strong indication many of Buddhism's followers, including those who belonged to Sthaviravadin schools, trended towards the transcendent although the Mahasanghikas are generally considered the school carrying the flag of Buddhist transcendentalism.
Appearing in the Vissudhi Magga, the Path of Purification Buddhaghosa's most well known work, are these ideas also championed by the Sarvastivadins, Theravadins and Sautrantikas. One is the theory of moments used to support the Personalists who claimed "...a person as an absolute truth, an ultimate reality...". Dharmatrata of the Sarvastivadins also supports the idea of "substance" as does the Vissudhi Magga. The Sarvastivadins also were the first to transcendentalize the Buddha.
Buddhaghosa's theory of moments is an especially important idea shared by the Vissudhi Magga and the Sthaviravadin schools. It is an important idea as it analysis human life into discrete momentary events. It is an idea Buddhaghosa could not provide any Buddhist evidence of (HBP p. 212). The Vissudhi Magga also promoted a number of other ideas generally applicable to the Mahayana school and in particular to the Yogacara school, an off shoot of the Sautrantikas.
The Vissuddhi Magga opens with this quote from the Samyutta Nikaya:
"A man established on virtue, wise,
Developing the mind and wisdom,
A bhikkhu ardent and discreet:
He can disentangle this tangle.
(Sagathavagga Devatasamyutta SN1. 13)
The Buddha wanted to "disentangle this tangle or the puzzle of life (HBP p. 209)." Buddhaghosa thought he was the man to answer this question as he equated "purification" with Nibbana (HBP p. 209)" and felt he had the path to it. He called the path to it the "threefold division of morality, concentration and insight (HBP p. 209)." When Buddhaghosa established these categories he established the "gradual" path to Nibbana, a path supported by the Tsao Dung [Ch.] or Soto [Jp.] religious sects. He analyzed each division with four roughly similar categories as follows. The first analysis is of the division of morality:
1. Morality has the characteristic of composing [silana].
2. Its quality is twofold: functional and consummative. Its functional quality is the
destruction of bad moral habits [dussilya] and its consummative quality is the
attainment of blamelessness [anavijja].
3. It manifests in the form of purity [soceyya].
4. Its foundation consists of sensitivity[ottappa] and modesty [hiri].
(HBP p. 210)
These characterizations may sound authentic, but, Buddhaghosa was unable to quote any authoritative text from the early discourses to justify his characterization of the divisions (HBP p. 210). Nevertheless, he proceeded to disentangle this tangle. In doing so, he surreptiously introduced "the substantialist as well as essentialist standpoints of the Sarvastivadins and Sautrantikas (HBP p. 210)". Ideas such as the particular or unique [sabhava = svabhava] and the universal or the abstract [samanna = samanya] were introduced, both being substantialist and essentialist ideas (HBP p. 211).
The fourth category, foundation is also a substantialist idea. The Buddha was wary of any ideas of permanence or substance being smuggled into the Buddhist narrative as such an occurrence will lead to a belief in soul or substance.
The same essentialist view introduced in the division on morality are also applied to the remaining divisions, concentration and insight. Here are the Vissudhi Magga's definitions of concentration:
1. Characteristic = non-distraction
2. Quality = elimination of distraction
3. Manifestation = non-wavering
4. Foundation = happiness
(HBP p. 213)
These conditions are based on forty different meditative techniques leading up to concentration and is made more complex by its association with insight (HBP p. 213).
The analysis of the division of insight is even more complicated as distinctions between insight, perception, consciousness and concentration are also involved as per the following passage:
Perception is like the child without discretion seeing the coin, because it apprehends the mode of appearance of the object as blue and so on. Consciousness is like the villager seeing the coin, because it apprehends the mode of the object as blue, etc., and because it extends further, reaching the penetration of its characteristics. Insight is like the money-changer seeing the coin, because, after apprehending the mode of the object as blue, etc., and extending to the characteristics, it extends still further, reaching the manifestation of the path (HBP p. 213 - 214).
Perception is the experience such as the perception of blue; consciousness is the conception or penetration into the essential nature [svabhava] of phenomena such as impermanence, suffering and non-substantiality. Insight is distinguished from these for its moral content, manifesting the path to freedom (HBP p.214). The following are the four conditions of insight:
1. Characteristic = penetration into the essential nature of phenomena
2. Quality = abolishing the darkness of confusion that conceals the
essential nature of phenomena
3. Manisfestation = non-delusion
4. Foundation = concentration
Before completing the Vissudhi Magga, Buddhaghosa had to explain what he meant by the word purification, the objective of his text. He explains nibbana [purification] as the attainment of these five kinds of purifications:
1. Purification of view
2. Purification by overcoming doubt
3. Purification by knowledge and vision of the path and non-path
4. Purification by knowledge and vision of practice [meditation]
5. Purification of knowledge and vision
(HBP p. 215)
Purification of view or right view is the Buddha's representation of Buddhist knowledge. Purification includes not having doubt about this knowledge. Purification #4 refers also to the practice of Buddhism. It is clear the five purifications represents the theory and practice of Buddhism These are the steps of the path to nibbana [purification].
In conjunction with the five purifications Buddhaghosa attaches what amounts to the Buddha's final practice. This meditation was completed by the Buddha immediately following his enlightenment. The final practice of the Buddha consists of the Buddha's complete and thorough grasp of the Four Noble Truths:
1. Thorough understanding of the truth of suffering
2. The relinquishing of the arising of suffering
3. The cultivation of the path leading to the cessation of suffering
4. The realization of the cessation of suffering
(HBP p. 215)
Throughout the Vissudhi Magga Buddhaghosa displayed his enormous knowledge of Buddhism. Just as importantly, Buddhaghosa introduced many other ideas relevant to Mahayana that were not spoken by the Buddha. It is as though Buddhaghosa foresaw the arising of the Mahayana. His previously discussed ideas, the theory of moments, of substance [svabhava], foundationalism and the gradual path became staples of the Mahayana. So did the following Buddhaghosa contributions to Mahayana thought:
The first is also in conjunction with the discussion on the five purifications. These are Buddhaghosa's reflections called the three gateways to freedom:
1. the absence of a mysterious cause [animitta]
2. the non-established that is, the absence of a foundation [appanihita]
3. the empty [sunna]
(HBP p. 215)
All of the gateways originated from the Buddha, however, gateways 1 and 2 describes the absence of a mysterious cause or foundation, whereas, gateway 3 describes the presence of the empty. When the Buddha spoke of the empty or emptiness [sunyatta] he was just speaking of the absence of "substance". By this he meant all things, including a person, are empty of a soul or substance. The presence of the empty gave the Mahayanists the opportunity to define the empty as a transcendental "great emptiness". It is a concept valued by all of the Mahayana schools.
Another quote of the Buddha used by Buddhaghosa is the following from the Samyutta Nikaya:
Bhikkhus, one who sees suffering also sees the origin of suffering, also sees
the cessation of suffering, also sees the way leading to the cessation of suffering.
(SN5. 437)
Buddhaghosa thereafter insists that all these four different activities take place simultaneously "during one moment" (HBP p. 215):
For this is said by the Ancients [porana]: Just as a lamp perform four functions simultaneously in a single moment---it burns the wick, dispels darkness, makes light appear, and uses up the oil---so, too, path-knowledge penetrates to the four truths simultaneously in a single moment---it penetrates to suffering by penetrating to it with full understanding [parinna], penetrates to arising by penetrating to it with relinquishing [pahana], penetrates to the path by penetrating it with cultivating [bhavana], and penetrates to ceasing by penetrating it it with realizing [sacckiriya]. (HBP p. 216).
Buddhaghosa was called the great harmonizer as he foresaw the objectives of Mahayana zen structure would evolve into the gradual path of the Tsao Dung [Ch.]/Soto [Jp.] and the instantaneous path of the Lin Chi [Ch.]/Rinzai [Jp.]. He also began the Vissudhi Magga with a foundationalist view and ended with an anti-foundationalist view. These ideas were transmitted to the Mahayana via the Sthaviravadin Yogacara school. However, because of his many other ideas including substance [svabhava], the empty, theory of moments, he more appropriately may have been labeled "the great transitionalist" rather than the "great harmonizer".
The Sarvastivadins correctly reasoned the most efficient way to raise the status of a transcendental Buddha was to remove from public memory the Three Gems of Buddhism, the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha. To this day those attending Mahayanist temples are unaware of the Three Gems. The transcendentalist "...openly denies the historical Buddha, rejects the doctrinal significance of the early discourses and condemns the community [sangha]... " These ideas comes into prominence in the Saddharmapundarika sutra (HBP p. 131) and other Mahayana literature.
Mahasanghikas
===========
The Mahasanghikas broke away from the Sthaviravadins in the second council at Vessali. The Theravada school of the Sthaviravadins retained the empirical teachings of original Buddhism as documented in the Sutta Pitaka. Its history is represented by two major Theravadin philosophers, Moggaliputtatissa and to a much lesser extent, Buddhaghosa.
The ideas and history of the Mahasanghikas, on the other hand, are realized through its Mahayana school. The creations of the Mahayana philosophers provides for the Mahayana and its founding school, the Mahasanghikas, its traditions.
Mahayana
========
The Mahayanists undoubtedly noticed how successful had been the Sarvastivadian campaign to remove the Three Gems from Buddhist history. Wishing to promote their own interpretation of Buddhism, they did so in a work created by their authors, the Prajna Paramita literature/the Perfection of Wisdom literature. Like the Hindu Vedas, its authors were unknown, giving the Prajna Paramita the impression of a divine origin. One of its sutras, the Saddharma Pundarika sutra, played an especially important role in advancing these major Mahayana ideas:
1. the rejection of the Arahant ideal of early Buddhism and replaced by the Boddhisativa of the Mahayana.
2. arguing for the transcendentalization of the Buddha.
3. establishing "emptiness" as a feature of their teachings. Emptiness is close to being ultimate reality, and is said to be "indescribable".
In the early Buddhist tradition, the Bhikkhus [monks] who had attained enlightenment were known as the Arahants, "...these are the foremost in the world, these are the best, that is, the Arahants (SN3. 83)". The only distinction the Buddha made between himself and the Arahants was that he was a teacher [sattha]
who showed them the way. The presence of the Pratyeka Buddhas [Arahants] could not be tolerated by the Mahayanists as monks who were instructed by an empirical Siddhatha Gotama would be too much of an obstruction when selling a transcendental Buddha to the public.
The Saddharma Pundarika Sutra
=======================
Although the condemnation of the Arahant ideal appeared earlier among the Theravada, Sarvastivada and Mahasanghika schools (BP p. 118), this development, along with the transcendence of the Buddha, became pronounced with the arrival of the Saddharma Pundarika Sutra.
The Saddharma Pundarika Sutra is one of nine works of the Prajna Paramita literature "...to which divine worship is offered (SAD p. ix)". Its interlocutor is none other than "...Sakyamuni, the Lord...(SAD p. x)." Given the Saddharma Pundarika sutra is a divine work and the Buddha is its interlocutor, there would be no reason at all to delay the transcendent description of the Buddha. Soon enough, in the second chapter of the Saddharma Pundarika sutra which is titled Skillfulness, the Buddha says to his co-conversant, Sariputra, "...the Buddha knowledge is profound, difficult to understand, difficult to comprehend...all laws Sariputra, are taught by the Tathgatha, and by him alone; no one but he knows all laws...(SAD p. 31, 32)".
What laws, what knowledge is the Buddha of the Saddharma Pundarika speaking of? The primary law discussed in the Saddharma Pundarika Sutra is the law of "dependent arising", thus its title "Lotus of the True Law". The following is the Mahayanists' description/knowledge of dependent arising:
It is impossible to explain it; it is unutterable; nor is there such a being in the world
to whom this law could be explained or who would be able to understand it when explained, with exception of the Bodhisattvas, those who are firm of resolve.
As to the disciples of the Knower of the world, those who have done their duty and received praise from the Sugatas, who are freed from faults and have arrived at the last stage of bodily existence [the arahants], the Gina [Buddha]-knowledge lies beyond their sphere (SAD p. 32, 33, BP p. 122).
This is a completely transcendental description of dependent origination---impossible to explain...unutterable... When similar words such as "indescribable" or "indefinable" are used by the absolutists of Indian thought, these are not words used to describe the empirical (NAG p. 16), but, the transcendent. Furthermore, only the Bodhisattvas are able to understand it, it is beyond the comprehension of the Arahants. In comparison, in the Samyutta Nikaya, the Buddha is asked "...what is dependent origination...?" The Buddha's response is a totally empirical explanation:
"...whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists [of causality], the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality [relativity (MN1. 167, BP p. 155)]. A Tathagata awakens to this and breaks through to it. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. And he says: 'See! With birth as condition, bhikkhus, aging and death'. (SN2.25, BP p. 115)".
The Buddha teaches it [dependent origination]...elucidates it...and in the Samyutta Nikaya explains the "stableness of the Dhamma, fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality" of dependent origination compactly as follows. He does not say any of it is indescribable or indefinable:
"When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases (SN2. 94 the Uninstructed)."
The Saddharma Pundarika Sutra not only establishes the transcendence of the Buddha, but, flips the primary law of Buddhism, dependent origination, on its head, from an empirical definition to a transcendental definition in order to compete with the immense popularity of transcendentalism throughout the world. To achieve that end, the Mahayanists also found it necessary to reduce the status of the Arahants and raise the status of the Boddhisatvas.
The Saddharma Pundarika, as it is with all transcendental scripture, is filled with fantastic and devotional language, meaningless except that it fulfills the needs of people religiously inclined. In the first introductory chapter, along with establishing the transcendence of the Buddhas and Bodhisatvas, the idea of duty is introduced. The Mahayanists, taking the cue of the Brahmins [Hindus], where in their Bhagavad-gita, Krishna instructs Arjuna on the purpose of his life, which is to fulfill the duties of the rajanya or kshatriya [warrior] caste to which Arjuna belongs. Throughout the Saddharma Pundarika "duty" is frequently mentioned. "Duty" is a concept dear to the hearts of the transcendentalists, transcendentalism always being accompanied by duty as by rain with clouds.
While the historical Buddha had no use for duty ethically or otherwise, even dearer to the hearts of the Mahayanists was their determination to establish the superiority of the Boddhisatvas over the Arahants. To bring this about, in chapter four titled Disposition, these words were purportedly spoken by the Arahants:
Lord, we are old, aged, advanced in years; honored as seniors in this assemblage of monks. Worn out by old age we fancy that we have attained Nirvana; we make no efforts, O Lord, for supreme perfect enlightenment; our force and exertion are inadequate to it. Though the Lord preaches the law and has long continued sitting, and though we have attended to that preaching of the law, yet, O Lord, as we have so long been sitting and so long attended the Lord's service, our greater and minor members, as well as the joints and articulations, begin to ache. Hence, O Lord, we are unable, in spite of the Lord's preaching, to realize the fact that all is vanity [or void], purposeless [or causeless, or unconditioned], and unfixed [sunya, empty]; we have conceived no longing after the Buddha-laws, the divisions of the Buddha-fields, the sports [display of magical phenomena] of the Bodhisatvas or Tathagatas. For by having fled out of the triple world, O Lord, we imagined having attained Nirvana, and we are decrepit from old age. Hence, O Lord, though we have exhorted other Bodhisatvas and instructed them in supreme perfect enlightenment, we have in doing so never conceived a single thought of longing. (SAD p. 98, 99, BP p. 119, 120).
There are a number of Mahayana conceptions in this passage which are there to establish a transcendental foundation for Buddhism. These are 1) supreme perfect enlightenment [samyaksambodhi], 2) Buddha laws, 3) Buddha fields, 4) the triple world and 5) sunya, empty.
Concept 1), the Buddha's final practice recorded in his first discourse (SN5. 423, n. 382), poses a problem as there is another version of dependent origination called the Proximate Cause Sutta (SN2. 29). Western transcendentalists have labeled this sutta the Tiparivata or Upanisa Sutta and claims it is a transcendental description of dependent origination (Transcendental Dependent Arising-An Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta-Online). This may be the version of dependent arising the Sadharma Pundarika is referring to or it may not. In any case, from an empirical standpoint, the Proximate Cause Sutta looks more like the Buddha's compilation of factors leading to the end of suffering which includes meditative and psychological factors leading to vision and common sense factors such as acquiring knowledge and having confidence (saddha) in the Dhamma. There seems to be nothing transcendental about the Proximate Cause Sutta when each factor is examined carefully.
Also, regarding point 1), the aspiration of the Bodhisattvas to achieve supreme perfect enlightenment, in the Mahayana view, makes them superior to the Arahants, whose "force and exertion are inadequate to it [the task of attaining the goal]" and "never conceived a single thought of longing [to achieve it]". In other words, attaining nibbana [as accomplished by the Arahants] is inferior to attaining Buddhahood [supreme perfect enlightenment], although the Bodhisattvas themselves have accomplished neither.
The second point 2), Buddha laws, are a set of Mahayana ethical principles [do not kill, do not steal, etc.] approximating what are called the virtues, silas or precepts in early Buddhism. The virtues are the elementary beginning of the Buddha's moral path (BP p. 59). It is hard to imagine a set of Mahayana concepts would not include at least a rudimentary salute to Buddhist ethics.
The third Mahayana concept, Buddha fields, is a pure realm where a Buddha or Bodhisattva teaches and guides beings to enlightenment (Google). This means a Bodhisattva delays attaining his personal achievements in order to aid others.
The 4th concept, the triple world originates from an Aryan conception of earth , atmosphere and sky [or heaven]. The triple world has been renamed by Buddhists as samsaric [rebirth] existence realms: 1) Desire realm, 2) Form realm, 3) Formless [immaterial] realm. Humans and gods are the sentient beings inhabiting the Desire realm. Sentient beings who occupy the Form and Formless realms are also gods, although in all cases they are not creator gods. Humans and gods are present in their realms as directed by their kammas (Google & Samye Institute online). The Saddharma Pundarika Sutra gives its interpretation of the Triple World on p. 88 in chapter three titled A Parable.
An important Mahayana concept not included in this apparent Arahant submission is that of the Three Vehicles. The Three Vehicles are comprised of the 1) Bodhisattiva vehicle [those who instruct others even onto omniscience SAD p. 41], 2) the Pratyeka vehicle [someone who learns without a teacher] and the 3) Sravaka vehicle [one who hears and listens]. The second and third vehicles are the Arahant vehicles. Here, the door is completely slammed on the possibility the Arahants are in any way responsible for the spreading of the Dhamma when it is stated in the Saddharma Pundarika by its Buddha:
By means of one sole vehicle, to wit, the Buddha vehicle, Sariputra, do I teach creatures the law; there is no second or third vehicle (SAD p. 40).
The Three Vehicles also establishes an Absolutism which justifies "...the ultimate reality of one goal [=Buddhahood] and the ultimate reality of one path [=Bodhisattiva] (HBP p. 172)" thus paving the way for the fifth Mahayana concept of ultimate sunya, emptiness. Siddhatha Gotama was opposed to absolutism of any kind, but here, finally the Mahayanists have established the Conceptual Absolutism of "emptiness" as the crowning achievement of their teachings.
However, the Saddharma Pundarika sutra itself "...gives us very little information as to what this Universal Absolute is...(HBP p. 170)." Although the word "void" is mentioned quite a few times, the word "emptiness" is not easily located and the Lotus' total reference to it "...would not amount to much... (HBP p. 170)" in spite of its being featured there and given an interpretation not held in the Sutta Pitaka.
The mystery of the "void" may have been preferred by the Mahayanists, but, "emptiness" is more "authoritative" having been used many time by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka.
Not to say "emptiness" is not an important concept in the Sutta Pitaka. Its importance is directly related to the third of the Three Characteristics of Existence, Anatta or non-self/non-substantiality, where the Buddha is saying every thing is empty of substance. Transcendence is never attributed to "emptiness" in the Sutta Pitaka as it is in the Mahayana.
At the beginning of this topic, Theravada-Mahayana History, it is stated Buddhist history is dominated by the influence of two ways of thinking: Theravada empiricism and Mahayana transcendentalism. It should be added that what counts with the Theravada are the words of the historic Buddha and what matters to the Mahayana are the words of their philosophers. However, it also should be assumed the words of Siddhatha Gotama the Buddha, originating largely in the Sutta Pitaka, are the words that matter the most. This is because all Buddhist philosophers, including those from the Mahayana, must justify their conclusions with evidence from the Sutta Pitaka or any other words originating from texts attributable to Siddhatha Gotama the Buddha. This, Nagarjuna, the greatest of the Mahayana philosophers does with the greatest of skill in his Mulyamaddhyamakka Kariika.
Mahayana Buddhist Philosophers
========================
Nagarjuna
========
Like Mogalliputatissa and Buddhaghosa, Nagarjuna was from the Brahman tradition. Upon discovering Buddhism, Nagarjuna went in search of the "other teachings of the Buddha" and his conversion to Buddhism probably occurred "after being deeply satisfied with [his studies] of the Prajnaparamita Suttras (HBP p. 181)". He became representative of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy. This sequence of events includes Nagarjuna's familiarity with the teachings of early Buddhism. In his most well known text, the Mulyamadhyaka Karika [Verses on the Fundamentals of the Middle way], it is evident that he was not as hostile as were other extreme Mahayana thinkers towards the original discourses of the Buddha and his disciples, the Arahants. This kind of hostility is disclosed repeatedly in such Mahayana texts as the Saddharma Pundarika Sutra (HBP p. 181).
The Mulyamadhyaka Karika "is a superb commentary on the Buddha's own Kaccayanagotta Sutta (NAG p. 5)" which happens to be the central topic in the Karika. The Kaccayanagotta Sutta is all about causality [see the discussion on the Kaccayanagotta Sutta under the topic of Right View in Post 1]. However, the idea of causality does not originate in Buddhism. It begins in the Upanisads.
There are a number of Upanisads expressing causality. One of the most famous is the Chandogya Upanisad where the sage Uddalaka Aruni says to his son Svetaketu, "That is reality. That is Atman. That art thou [Tat tvam asi], Svetaketu (SIP p. 68, 69)". This quote states three things: 1) the unity of Atman [self/soul] and Brahman [God], 2) causality - effect pre-exists in the cause, 3) we are all connected.
Causality is also foundational to both early Buddhism and later Mahayana Buddhism. This can be seen in the Two Truths of Buddhism. Although the Two Truths are most well known as Buddhist, its origins are also in the Hindu Upanisads. In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, both truths, the Empirical and the Ultimate are found in the following Two Forms of Brahman:
There are, assuredly, 2 forms of Brahman [God]: the formed and the formless, the mortal and immortal, the stationary and the moving, the actual and the yon (SIP p. 79).
The Two Truths of early Buddhism are similarly structured although it is fundamentally different from the Brhadaranyaka model as the Buddha never spoke of anything as "ultimate" or "absolute". Rather, he labeled the truths as "empirical/conventional" and the higher as simply "deeper truths".
Empirical/Conventional Truth
======================
Ordinarily, when we speak of others we speak of other persons as other selves. Likewise, the world consists of the things we sense such as mountains, oceans, plants and animals, buildings, bridges, etc.
Deeper Truths
===========
A person consists of the Five Aggregates [khandas] absent of a soul. A person and all things of the world are impermanent. All physical and mental phenomena are caused or dependently arisen [paticcasamuppada]. Attachment and craving leads to human suffering.
Two Truths of Mahayana Buddhism
==========================
The labeling of the Two Truths of later Mahayana Buddhism are similar to the Brhadaranyaka model as 1) Conventional Truth: The everyday, practical reality and as 2) Ultimate Truth: the Emptiness [sunyata] of all phenomena as expressed by Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna also equated emptiness with dependent arising. However, nowhere in the Nikayas does the Buddha state explicitly emptiness is equated with dependent arising or is dependently arisen, as, for instance, he does with consciousness:
"...the Blessed One has stated consciousness to be dependently arisen, since without a condition there is no origination of consciousness (Mahatanhasankhaya MN1. 257)."
The Mahayanists claim a sutta where the Buddha equated emptiness with dependent arising is the Culasunnata Sutta. He is quoted as saying the "void [is empty] of what is not there (MN3. 105)." At first glance this quote appears the Buddha is just repeating the third characteristic of existence, anatta, that existence is without a soul/self or substance.
But, the Mahayanists have another interpretation. Consulting with the Majjhima Nikaya Atthakata [a pali commentary on the Majjhima Nikaya] they discover "void" along with other words such as "signless" are words used for Nibbana. And what a discovery it is! Not only is void an equivalent of dependent arising but the equivalent of nibbana itself! (The Greater Series of Questions and Answers MN1. 298, n. 458).
It is also of interest the word "void" appears in the earlier Brahman literature, the Vedas, in the vedic Hymn of Creation (SIP p. 23). It is of interest as it is a strong indication, in context with the Upanisads, that Mahayana Ultimate Truth is modeled upon Hindu transcendentalism. This will become apparent with the discussion on the later Mahayana Buddhist philosphers Vasubandhu and Dinnaga.
***************************************************************
Originally this blog was titled "Early Buddhist Dhamma" which is a more appropriate title for the contents of this blog than is the title "Ideas in Buddhism". Other interpretations of Buddhist ideas are not represented in this blog, especially those of the Vajrayanna, a major omission. Since this is the case and since my original objective has been accomplished, presenting the Buddha's ethics, philosophy, world view and psychology, I would like to end the discussion on the Mahayana at this time. For those wishing to learn more of the Mahayana I would recommend these titles by Dr. David Kalupahana:
1) Buddhist Philosophy - A Historical Analysis
2) A History of Buddhist Philosophy - Continuities and Discontinuities
3) Nagarjuna - The Philosophy of the Middle Way
The Buddha's Transformation Into A Cosmic Principle
=======================================
The remaining topic planned for discussion is The Buddha's Transformation Into A Cosmic Principle. This topic is necessarily very speculative as human knowledge doesn't even include the knowledge of what space and time are. It is true humans have schemed time into segments useful for human activities, but, what time is remains unknown. In spite of the formidable discoveries of "absolute" natural laws in physics, chemistry, biology and genetics assuring us planes and buildings will not fall from the sky, why lead will not turn to gold, a water melon seed will not turn into a tomato, the ultimate constituents of matter has never been resolved. The search for the indivisible continues. Will the unchanging, permanent, absolute ever be discovered? Christian/western science is betting millions, billions and trillions of dollars that permanence is discoverable motivated very often out of mere curiosity and to satisfy transcendent urges.
The rationalists' discovery of "absolute" natural laws via deductive reasoning may seem absolute, but, these laws are valid only if permanence is assumed. The Buddha's world view was quite different from that of the rationalists who saw permanence everywhere, whereas, the Buddha saw impermanence. "Absolute" natural laws may appear permanent, but, this is only because change regarding things like natural laws involve immense time scales before any change is perceptible or detectable. When the cosmos changes, and it certainly will, natural laws will change as well. These changes may occur over hundreds or thousands or even millions of years and more. In Aristotle's time natural laws may seem permanent just as they appear now, but, the cosmos will reveal its impermanence millions or billions of years from now and natural laws will follow suit. Natural laws are permanent only because this is what the transcendentalists believe. In total opposition to this claim, the Buddha relied on inductive reasoning [anvayenana], the reasoning of probabilities as an important aid.
In the 1600's, two French mathematicians, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat, together invented the field of probability (Stories, Dice and Rocks that Think - Byron Reece p. 152, 153). It is a field that is a "purely mathematical method of divination based on---of all things---randomness and upon which our modern world is now built (Stories, Dice and Rocks that Think - Byron Reece p. 149)". Riding on the nascent wave of the only capitalism the world has known, the Christian/western model, the edifice of modern capitalism was erected---banking, finance, insurance, accounting, marketing, production, the inventions of corporations and stocks and bonds, etc.---all relying on decisions based on probability for their success.
The Buddha was the first disseminator of capitalist ideas [or, as chatgpt puts it "ideas of a political economy"]. He lived in the earliest years of capitalist history, money having been invented just a few centuries before his birth. His experience of capitalism was probably not much more than a farmer selling his vegetables on the side of the road. In spite of the sparseness of his capitalistic experiences, his experiences gave him a profound understanding of capitalist principles, including its "boom" and "bust" cycles and capitalism's tendencies [or human tendencies toward greed, hatred and delusion] which often resulted in widespread income disparities and exploitation of human and natural resources. The Buddha also had a deep appreciation for the benefits capitalism could bring to society provided its evolution is accompanied by moral development. He was also well aware of capitalism's dangers [see Post 1 under the topic Right Livelihood].
Did it ever enter into the minds of either Blaise Pascal or Pierre de Fermat that future probability discoveries would supplant the prevailing rational understanding of the cosmos? Perhaps, but, not likely as both were products of a tradition relying on the absolute certainty of deductive reasoning, brought to what they believed is a permanent world. The Buddha, on the other hand "knew" because he was confident nothing is permanent [with the exception of Nibbana, the permanence of which is still debated by scholars], that randomness [inductive reasoning] prevails in an impermanent cosmos.
In a few centuries after Pascal's and Fermat's time, the discovery of quantum mechanics/physics exploded unto the world's awareness. Today we know quantum mechanics/physics deals with the behavior of matter at the atomic and sub-atomic levels and is successful in answering questions in many areas unexplainable by classical physics. Strangely most in the world still believes in permanence. An early quantum physics discovery is that things happen on the basis of probability. However, this probability is not the same as that found in games of chance. Where the outcomes of games of chance are predictable [provided sufficient information is accumulated in regard to their operation] outcomes in the quantum world are unpredictable, the results are pure probabilities (Chatgpt). This, nevertheless, prompted an exasperated Albert Einstein to famously declare, "God does not play dice with the universe!" However, the evidence is otherwise, we do live in a casino of sorts.
The behavior of matter in the quantum world is unimaginable to many others as well. Weird, strange, non-intuitive, it turns everything upside down, are a few responses of scientists. But, what is strange to the Buddha are imagined things like the soul, free will and intuition. Everything is not turned upside down, but, in the quantum world, everything is right side up; what is being observed is impermanence, which, in the Buddhist view, is seeing things as they are. What is expected by most is a permanent view of the cosmos, but, what is happening---things are both waves and particles, things are located in two different places at the same time---doesn't sound like a description of permanence.
The Mahayanists realized the Buddha was talking about the nature of the cosmos in a way not understood before and proceeded to transcendentalize him a "Cosmic Principle". Like many religions, if not all, science has a creation story as well, the Big Bang. Science also has an end story, the Whimpering End. Science's view of reality has not yet been completed.
Buddhism, on the other hand, does not have a creation story, but, it does have three views of reality. Each view represents that of the three different schools of Buddhist philosophy: 1) the Original, 2) the Madhyamaka and 3) the Yogacara. The first Original amounts to nothing more than the Two Truths of Original Buddhism, the Empirical/Conventional Truth---the ordinary world experienced by humans of selves, mountains, oceans, plants, animals, etc.---and the Deeper Truths of the Three Characteristics of Existence---impermanence, suffering and non-self among other things. In regard to Empirical/Conventional truth, at the same time remember the Buddha rejected these human models---the Personalists, Realists and thirdly the Transcendentalists.
The remaining two originates from two Mahayana schools. The Madhyamaka, like the Original Buddhism, has two views of reality, the Conventional---with the Madhyamaka and its leader, Nagarjuna, are realists seeing the world an everyday practical reality consisting of people or individual selves, plants and animals, mountains and oceans, etc. and a second view, an Ultimate Reality symbolized by its concept of Emptiness.
Another opposing reality is that of the Yogacara who maintained that only "the mind or consciousness is real (BP p. 143)". That is, all human experiences occur only in the mind or consciousness. The followers of Yogacara were labeled idealists [reality is mind only]. The ideas of the Yogacara, a school related to the Sautrantika emerged from the second Brahman school of philosophy, the Yoga. The Yoga school was founded on the Hindu Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. Hence, Yogacara practices are of self discipline or practice of Yoga. Three of the most prominent of the Yogacara philosophers are Asanga, his half brother Vasubandhu and Vasubandhu's pupil Dinnaga. Unsystemized Yogacara thought first appeared in Mahayana sutras Sandhinirmocana Sutra [Freeing the Underlying Meaning] and the Lankatavara Sutra [Descent Into Lanka] (BP p. 142). A systemized Yogacara text is Asanga's most well known work the Abhidharmasamuccaya in which he gave an idealistic interpretation to the Abhidhamma (HBP p. 242).
Another is Vasubhandu's Vijnaptimatratasiddhi [Establishment of Mere Conception]. The Vijnaptimatratasiddhi is composed of two parts, the Vimsatika [Twenty Versus] and Trimsika [Thirty Versus]. In the Vimsatika Vasubandhu explained authentic human experience is "internal". "External" experience is only inferable and therefore not real [Wikipedia]. In the Trimsika Vasubandhu argued against the realists by claiming waking experiences and dream experiences are the same as both are the same in all these categories 1) space, 2) time, 3) uniformity and 4) actuality (BP p. 144). In each of these categories the human experience is the same whether one is awake or in a dream state.
It may appear Vasubandhu was firmly in the Idealist camp, but, like Nagarjuna he was in search of the historical/Buddha and his original message (HBP p. 184)". Although Vasubandhu's argument against the realists in the Trimsika is a metaphysical argument, Stefan Anacker, author of Seven Works of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist Psychological Doctor says "he was no metaphysical idealist (HBP p. 186, n. 3)".
Dinnaga, as were all the other major Mahayana philosophers was from the Brahmin background and took a more standard Indian approach, reasoning and argumentation, when arguing his differences with the realists. His Pramanasamuccaya is rated the greatest work on Buddhist logic and he was considered the foremost of the Buddhist logicians (BP p. 150). In his Alambanapariksa [Examination of the Object], he created a field related to idealism, Indian Immaterialism.
Of these three versions of Buddhist reality---the Original, tthe Madhyamaka version and the Yogacara---the most comprehensive appears to be the Original. This is because the two truths of original Buddhism includes the conventional truth of ordinary human life and the deeper truths amounting to the three characteristics of existence---anicca [impermanence], dukkha [suffering] and anatta [non-self/non-substantiality], Of these, dukkha most importantly points to the fact that ethics and morality has everything to do with human suffering, an idea that cannot be omitted from any description of Buddhist reality.
The Madhyamaka's first truth approximates that of original Buddhism's, but, its second truth, Ultimate Truth, is completely at odds with that of original Buddhism. The Buddha never described anything as ultimate, absolute or eternal. This is where Madhyamaka reality is markedly different from the reality of original Buddhism.
The third Buddhist reality, the Yogacara, has a good argument as both the Madhupundikka and the Eighteen Elements Suttas (SN2. 140) maintains human experience occurs in the mind or consciousness. However, to say "reality is mind only" is misleading as the sense organs are physical objects and its objects are also composed of matter. Original Buddhism's view is that the physical is as much a part of human experience as is the mental, in respect to either truth, the conventional or the deeper.
A Brief Summary of Buddhism
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Except for the Buddhist reign of Emperor Asoka in about 200 BCE, Buddhist presence was short lived in India. Even Asoka's reign was a mere thirty years (google). There are many reasons why Buddhism's influence in India ended with such finality. A major reason can be found in this statement by the Buddha in the Samyutta Nikaya:
"This world, Kaccana, is for the most part shackeled by engagement, clinging and adherence (Nidana Samyutta SN2. 17)".
The Buddha was fully aware of the formidable opposition Buddhism faced when he described "This world is for the most part [75%? - 85%?]" a world that favored attachment based ethics. This means the world was fully opposed to Buddhism's detachment-non attachment based ethics. Those Buddhists with transcendental tendencies, amounting to those also favoring attachment based ethics, soon enough recognized transcendent Hinduism and to a lesser extent transcendent Jainism, had hit home runs in India. To compete with the transcendentalists, similar thinking Buddhists decided they could benefit by playing the same game. Thus arose the Mahayanist movement in India.
Another factor that contributed to Buddhism's decline in India is the belief of Indians that Buddhism is foundationally no different from Hinduism. Among those luminaries supporting this idea are Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Rhys Davis who are quoted as follows:
Radhakrishnan: "Early Buddhism is not an absolutely original doctrine...It is no freak in the evolution in Indian thought (IP p. 360)".
Davis: "Gautama was born and brought up and lived and died a Hindu...(IP p. 361)".
These luminaries held these opinions in spite of the fact they were well aware the Buddha's greatest criticisms were directed against the transcendentalists, especially Hinduism in particular, Hinduism being the most popular of the transcendental teachings in India. See for example his criticism of Brahmin sacrificial practices which he considered as harmful to the dispositions of body, speech and mind (AN4. 42).
It is true the Buddha was a world philosopher relying on investigation and reflection in support of his views, but, he was also totally an Indian philosopher expressing himself through reasoning and argumentation. Because he was such a person many may have come to believe he must be Hindu. Even though he lived in a culture dominated by Hindu/Brahmin ideas and values, anyone having read the Sutta Pitaka would have difficulty coming to the conclusions of Radhakrishnan and Davis. Buddhism's Dhamma is totally an original world view, a philosophy of life unlike any other and is very much an argument against the views of his opponents. Because the Buddha was opposed to the philosophical views of almost all Indian philosophies and religions, for a reader to understand the Sutta Pitaka arguments it is also necessary to know the views of his competitors. The Buddha was not so much a contrarian as he was a person who saw the weaknesses of the views of his opponents, especially of their ethical views.
Knowledge of the ethical views of his competitors was paramount to the Buddha as he saw his objective of removing suffering an entirely ethical problem. The Buddha also saw there would be resistance to his arguments. While attachment based ethics is favored throughout the world, Buddhism's detachment/non-attachment based ethics is widely disliked. Most in the world are attached to their likes. However, the Buddha is not talking about likes and dislikes. All he talks about has ethical and moral purpose. From the Buddhist standpoint, attachment is a question of preference, what one's likes or dislikes are. Nevertheless, attachment based ethics is Buddhism's greatest ethical opposition and has been so for thousands of years.
One can reflect on the world's past ethical history and find that this question arises, "is this ethical status quo satisfactory to those living today?". Today, Yuval Noah Harari [a Jewish historian and philosopher] says we are living in a new kind of ethic: consumerism (Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind p. 347). Before you decide if this new development bodes well for the future of humankind, consider Harari's next comment: "the history of ethics is a sad tale (Sapiens p. 349)." However, he does not fault several religions [including Buddhism and Confucianism, neither of which are really religions] for this sad state of affairs, but, its followers who were not true to the teachings of their respective "religions". Harari finds some likely suspects for this situation in the monotheists who "over the last two millenia repeatedly tried to strenghthen their hand by violently exterminating all competition (Sapiens p. 218)."
A final summary on Buddhism: Buddhism argues it is attachment/craving that leads to bad human behaviour and human suffering and that detachment and non-attachment will lead to the good and peaceful and the end of the suffering of humans and other living things. This is an ethic that appears at the very beginning of the Dhamma, the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path.
This ends Post 4 and Ideas in Buddhism
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